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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to address the role of
initiative in Soviet Air Force fighter tactics and employ-
ment. Contrary to a popular misconception, there is indi-
vidual initiative in the Soviet Air Force and, not all
Soviet pilots nor their commanders are incapable of indi-
vidual decision making during a dynamic battle. x The
following four questions set the basic framework for the
research and findings of this thesis:
1) Is initiative important in fighter combat?
2) Do the Soviets believe initiative is important in
fighter tactics?
3) Have the Soviets historically shown the ability to
..develop and use initiative in their tactics?
4) Do the Soviets currently stress or train for the use
of initiative in fighter combat?
A. IMPORTANCE OF INITIATIVE
Is the ability to make decision independently in the
heat of battle important for fighter pilots? Or, on the
other hand, is flying a memorized set of maneuvers without
any modification or adjustment sufficient for winning
dogfights and delivering bombs? This question of the impor-
tance of initiative is dealt with only briefly because of
the overwhelming evidence from testimonials of those who
have been in combat. Events in war by their nature are not
predictable with 100% accuracy. Battles are dynamic and
flexibility and initiative are necessary to win. Creativity
and initiative have been used to achieve victory since
*An example of US preconceptions is in the article. "The
Soviet Offensive-An Attack Pilot's View, by LtCol Kieiing
Jr. , Air University Review , Mar-Apr, p. 66. He states,
"the Soviet soldier is commonly a product of initiative
deaden: ng repetition. " While this may be true concerning
Soviet ground soldiers, this thesis will show that Soviet
airmen nave a history of initiative.
Biblical times; such as the defeat of the Midianites by a
greatly out- numbered force of Hebrews. 2
In modern air warfare "Historically superior pilot skill
(technical superiority aside) has proven to be more than the
equivalent of numbers. " [ Ref . 1: p. 110] This means more
than the ability to fly an aircraft in a tighter turn than
one's opponent; superior tactics and the ability of pilots
to act and think on their own initiative has made the
difference in winning and losing. During WWII the
US-Japanese exchange rate for 1943-44 was 10: 1 with longer
pilot training given the credit for the difference [Ref. 1:
p. Ill] . Further, even when fighting against a superior
aircraft, the US managed a 10: 1 ratio against the Chinese in
1950 due to "superior skills of the Sabre pilots." [Ref. 2:
p. 22] Their skill was not just technical flying skill; but
was individual initiative fully developed into the pilots'
tactical thinking. Another example is Vietnam when Navy Top
Gun training, which places a strong emphasis on initiative
led, to a 400% increase in the exchange ratio, changing it
from 2.5:1 to 12.5:1. [Ref. 3]. Finally, the most recent
example of pilot skill and tactics incorporating initiative
leading to victory was during the 1982 Israeli— Syrian
engagement which yielded an 80: 1 ratio in favor of the
Israeli pilots [Ref. 3: p. 23]. Therefore, because of the
demonstrated importance of having the tactical edge which
includes the exercise of initiative, it is important to have
a realistic view of Soviet tactics in terms of their flexi-
bility and the initiative of their pilots.
2 The Midianites whose "camels could no more be counted
than the sand on the seashore" were defeated by 300
Israelites. Judges, Chapter 7, New International Version
of The Bible .
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B. SOVIET OUTLOOK ON INITIATIVE
Do the Soviets believe initiative is important? Soviet
military philosophy stress a "scientific" approach to
fighting war. As A. D. Sokolovskiy wrote in Military
Strategy,
the current and profoundly scientific solution of all
the theoretical and practical questions of waging a war
must be regarded as the main task of the theory of mili-
tary strategy and strategic leadership. [ Ref . 4: p.
193J
However, the Soviets are also aware of the fast pace of
modern warfare which may preclude the searching for the
"scientific" solution to a given tactical problem.
the commander must primarily learn to use his combat
equipment in the dynamics of battle . . . sometimes in a
relatively calm and static situation, an officer is
prudent and correctly asseses all factors when giving a
subunit its task. But as soon as the troops begin
moving ... he is incapable of using his knowledge with
the speed demanded by battle. [Ref. 5: p. 121]
Speed and swiftness in battle have increasingly become part
of Soviet warfare doctrine. A. V. Suvarov points out
"procrastination is like death. An instant gives victory.
One instant decides the outcome of a battle, one hour the
success of a campaign." [Ref. 6: p. 192] Thus, the Soviets
are aware of the need to make instant decisions in combat to
the point where they are now exchanging "quality for the
sake of speed." [Ref. 7: p. 121] [Ref. 8: p. 197] The issue
is do modern Soviet Air Force command style and tactics
allow for the freedom of actions or initiative necessary to
make independent decisions in combat. Chapter 2 discusses
the balance being made between the Soviets' scientific
philosophy and their realization of the need for initiative.
C. HISTORICAL PRECEDENCE
Today there are interesting parallels between the
balance of forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and that of
Pre-WWil Germany and Russia. Just as before World War II,
the Soviet Air Eorce is rapidly becoming the largest in the
world. In 1939, the USSR had 5000 aircraft [ Ref . 9: p. 32]
and in 1941 alone built 15,800 aircraft [Ref. 10: p. 20]
while Germany had 3000 and France 2100 in 1940 [Ref. 11:
p. 32]. Today, aircraft are being produced at such a rate,
that NATO's entire Central European fighter forces could be
replaced every two-and-a-half years [Ref. 12: p. 1] (Each
year the Soviets produce over 1,000 fighter aircraft. This
would replace NATO's Central European force of roughly 2200
combat aircraft every two-and-a-half years. ) [Ref. 13: pp.
11,21,153] However, despite their numerical superiority at
the outset of Operation Barbarossa, having approximately
7000 aircraft to the Germans' 2000 on the Eastern Front
[Ref. 14: pp. 35,38] the Red Air Force lost 4990 aircraft to
the Germans' 179 within a week [Ref. 15]. It is postulated
that these losses were a result of surprise and, perhaps
more importantly, because of inferior training, tactics, and
command style. However, following their crushing defeat,
the Red Air Force learned significant tactical lessons which
enabled them to eventually defeat the Luftwaffe. Chapter 3
traces this development of initiative, flexibility, and
creativity in Soviet fighter, ground attack and bomber
tactics.
This thesis is primarily concerned with initiative in
fighter tactics; however, bomber tactics of WWII are also
discussed because of the great impact bomber operations had
on the war and the impact that the planning of bomber opera-
tions had on Soviet Air Force philosophy following the war.
Soviet bomber operations developed into massive raids, known
as Air Operations, involving thousands of aircraft. These
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were orchestrated through extensive preplanning and
centralized control. The large numbers of aircraft required
a certain amount of rigidness; spontaneous initiative would
cause confusion in these operations. As the air operations
grew in size so did the influence of their commanders.
Influence of the fighter commanders who highly favored
initiative declined as their units became subordinated to
Air Operation commanders. Following the war the commanders
of these successful operations who were proponents of tight
control and "scientific" solutions to tactical questions had
a great deal of influence and impact on the Air Force's
development—including fighter air.
D. CURRENT STRESS ON INITIATIVE
The final area of this thesis is the Soviets' current
stress on initiative in fighter tactics. This addresses the
questions: How much did commanders supporting preplanning
overrule the lessons of initiative learned during WWII and
is initiative still an important part of fighter tactics?
Articles in Soviet military journals suggest the old Soviet
leadership may be asking these same questions themselves and
seeking answers from WWII. For example, "The command cadres
of the Air Force, our pilots and navigators, must study
creatively the experience of the past war, in order to
extract everything of value that can be of use in combat
training. " [ Ref . 16: p. 6] Also, General-Lieutenant of
Aviation Pavlov asked in 1976, "is it possible that I am
fighting for the past? Has the development of new equipment
and weapons made frontline soldiers' mastery of combat,
tactical findings, and creative approaches obsolete, strip-
ping them of their instructiveness and educational value?"
[Ref. 17]
To understand current stress on initiative relative to
the very high stress initiative received during WWII, a
content analysis was done on the Official Journal of the
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Soviet Air Force from 1957 to 1984. 3 (Data was not available
for years prior to 1957) This study (Chapter 4) shows the
drop in emphasis on initiative through the 1960's as tech-
nology developed. The increased speeds of jet aircraft and
the development of air-to-air missiles, improved radar and
command and control systems accompanied a loss of emphasis
on initiative. This trend reversed, however, in the
mid-1970' s and initiative has grown in emphasis into the
1980' s.
In addition to the content analysis, recent tactical
developments are analyzed to show the elements of initiative
which exist in current Soviet fighter tactics. Finally, the
tactics used in Afghanistan are discussed to highlight the
Soviets' capacity for initiative combined with the strong
tendency towards control and elimination of any need for
initiative.
This thesis presents a balanced view of initiative in
Soviet fighter tactics. Predominant in current US Air Force
thinking is that Soviet pilots are suppressed under the
obedience to tight control of the centralized command and
control system. It is believed Russian flyers are good
"technicians" but are not prepared for free flowing
dogfights common in western training; the US has initiative
but the Soviets do not. [ Ref . 18: p. 83] This thesis chal-
lenges this thinking to present a more balanced perspective
on initiative in the Soviet Air Force. Despite tight
controls, there has been and is initiative in the Soviet Air
Force . Given the opportunity, it presents itself
effectively.
3 From the early 1900 s to 1962 the Journal was titled
Herald of the Air Fleet . In 1962, the title changed to its
current one, Avlation and Cosmonautics .
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E. DEFINITION
For this thesis, decision making primarily involves
choosing tactics, methods of attack, what target to attack,
the number of aircraft to use in attacks, etc. Decisions
can be pre-planned in which case no initiative is involved.
Pilots fly a memorized set of maneuvers by rote. This can
lead to stereotyped predictable actions. On the other hand,
in a changing environment, a pilot can choose at will his
tactics or invent new tactics on the spot to fit the unique
situation. This is individual initiative as used in this
paper.
F. SOURCES
Research involved using existing works on the history of
the Soviet Air Force and Soviet Military Historical
Journals. Most important was the Soviets' discussion of
WWII history, their command principles, and tactics. To
balance the Soviet rhetoric on WWII events, data from the
USAF Historical Studies as well as Luftwaffe commanders'
narratives were used.
Careful attention was paid to the Soviet writings to
balance their rhetoric with western facts and appraisals.
It is important to remember the journals of the Soviet Air
Force are written primarily for their own airmen and not for
western readers while at the same time the authors are aware
of US intelligence analysts reading their material. Thus,
it is improbable that the Soviets would put blatant misin-
formation in these writings when they are used to keep thou-
sands of their own pilots and commanders informed. Such a
policy would require an incredible back-up network of writ-
ings to correct any wrong information and would run a great
risk of having ill-informed aviators. On the other hand,
the writings must be cautiously read because the controlled
13
press and closed society have the liberty to rewrite history
as they see fit. Therefore, it was with a critical mind
that the Soviet journals and writings were researched with
the benefit of western history and intelligence analysis.
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II. SOVIET INITIATIVE
A. THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACH
This chapter discusses what the Soviets think about
initiative in fighter tactics. To understand the real
nature of Soviet initiative, it must be defined in the
overall context of Russian social and military culture.
This chapter begins with a discussion on the Russian concept
of war to form a base upon which the concept of initiative
will be built.
1. Science as Ideology
Soviet thinking on war begins with Marx and Lenin.
To communist ideology war is a manifestation of political-
economic reality and is governed by the immutable laws of
history. Marx's scientific study of economics set the foun-
dation for applying scientific approaches and solutions to
all aspects of life. "War teaches Marxism-Leninism is a
socio-historical phenomenon . . . its essence can be
revealed only by using the scientific method. " [ Ref . 4: p.
173] With this method, war and combat techniques are studied
in the context of military doctrinal laws and military
science. The scientific method is involved in the military
from the broad aspects of doctrine to the details of
tactics. "During peacetime, when there is an absence of
combat experience, military science and theoretical fore-
sight possess decisive significance in developing the
methods to conduct an armed conflict. " [Ref. 4: p. 275]
Military doctrine is the official policy of the
Communist Party at the Soviet Union [Ref. 19: p. 74]. As
Marshal N. V. Ogarkov stated, "Soviet military doctrine is a
system of guiding principles and scientifically substanti-
ated views of the CPSU and the Soviet government on the
essence, character, and methods of waging war." [Ref. 20]
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Military doctrine has two facets - "socio-political" and
"military- technical. " The socio-political side deals v/ith
the methodological, economic, social and legal basis of
winning a future war. The military-technical side conforms
with the socio-political and directs "military structuring"
and methods for conducting combat operations. [ Ref . 21: p.
240] Because party leadership determines doctrine, it is a
non-debatable guideline in accordance with which the mili-
tary leadership must function. In wartime the political
aspect of doctrine is accentuated. As a Soviet textbook on
the subject points out: "Politics determines the priority
and strength of blows inflicted on the enemy. " [Ref. 22]
Military science on the other hand is theoretical laws and
principles of warfare applied to military operations.
Military science differs from doctrine in that it is
studied and debated by the military leadership [Ref. 19: p.
74] . Since the communist revolution, a scientific approach
to war has been part of Soviet military thinking; V. I. Lenin
emphasized that it is impossible to organize a modern army
without science. [Ref. 23]
Combining doctrine with science, the Soviets opera-
tionalize the methods for conducting warfare in military
art. Military art is composed of three main elements:
strategy, operational art, and tactics. Each of these areas
form methodologies for conducting warfare at different
levels and sizes of battles. For example, strategy deals
with fighting an entire war on a theater of military opera-
tions (TVD) level; a large geographical region which could,
for example, include all of Western Europe. Operational art
covers front and army levels of operations; a front is a
geographical area within a TVD. There are roughly 3-5
fronts within a TVD and each front would have within it
several armies operating. Tactics correspond to division or
smaller size engagements. [Ref. 19: p. 75]
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Science is a part of each of these methodologies.
"The covert and profoundly scientific solution of all theo-
retical and practical questions related to the preparation
and waging of ... a war must be regarded as the main task
of the theory of military strategy and strategic leader-
ship. " [ Ref . 4: p. 193] This influence of the scientific
method is very much a part of air force strategy and
tactics. For example, leading Soviet Air Force tacticians
stress the role of science in fighter tactics:
Simulation or modeling has been employed for quite some
time as a method of scientific cognition in the area of
military scientific investigation, personnel study,
immediate preparation and conduct of combat. It is
quite understandable that modeling could not ignore
factics .... including dynamic models of air combat,
airstrike on a ground target ( individual stages') , or a
combat air mission in general. [Ref. 24: p. 77
2. Science as Control
In addition to the ideological emphasis of the
scientific method, Russian culture is predisposed to this
approach. Culturally, man is viewed as inherently evil or
sinful and therefore must be controlled [Ref. 25]. This
perception of man has been manifested over the last several
centuries as the secretive collective leadership of the
village Mir 4 ; the powerful centralized control of the Tsar;
and the tight control of the current party apparatus with
its secret police and powerful methods of controlling the
population. The Russian leadership has a historical and
cultural conditioning that makes a scientific approach very
attractive as a tool of control.
4 Mir is the name of the old leadership committees of
villages. Individualism was suppressed because the survival
of a village depended upon group efforts against the
elements ot nature and neighboring villages.
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Through the scientific approach pilots and
commanders can be controlled. If all tactics are decided
upon by a scientific deduction, then, all pilots will fly
the tactics in the prescribed manner without question.
Elements of creative thinking or initiative could be done
away with by prescribing how every aspect of combat should
be flown. Likewise, through the scientific method, some
elements of chance, such as, not knowing what tactics pilots
may fly in a given battle could be eliminated and commanders
and planners could then mathematically insert their fighter
forces into the overall "scientific" battle plan.
However, the scientific approach to tactics has not
always been completly accepted by the Air Force. Instead
scientific methodology has had an evolutionary growth. The
emphasis on a scientific approach in the Soviet Air Force
increased greatly in the late 50' s and early 60' s. New
technology brought improved ways of monitoring and control-
ling aircraft and reducing some of the uncertainties of how
pilots were flying. An example of this increased emphasis
in control is the development of a system for recording each
individual aircraft's flight parameters. The system, known
as the SARPP-12, makes analog computer printout of the
aircraft's altitude, airspeed, angle of attack, G-loading,
etc. An example of 5 of these recordings is shown in 2. 1
This type of monitoring capability allows the flight
instructor or squadron commander to check each pilot on how
accurately they fly the approved tactics and techniques.
Once a mission is flown, the tapes can be down loaded and
the entire air scenario recreated mathematically.
Deviations from approved methods or tactics could then be
easily spotted and corrected.
In addition to monitoring equipment to implement the
scientific approach to tactics, "Military Science Societies"
were introduced into Air Force units. The introduction of
18
Figure 2. 1 SARPP-12 Printout.
these units was justified by the leadership saying such
societies had existed in the Red Army even during the Civil
War. Therefore what was good for the revolutionary fathers
is good for us. Also, these societies were described as
"playing an important role in the Red Army and in height-
ening the quality of combat training." [ Ref . 27: p. 56]
The objective of these military science societies
was to "seek out the most efficient methods for conducting
combat operations." [Ref. 27: p. 56] To do this, mathemat-
ical computations and equations for all aspects of flying
were created. For example in a 1958 article by Col V. Ya
Kudryashov and Lt Col P. A. Mikitin, a scientific method full
of mathematical equations sets out to determine the combat
capabilities of fighters and predict the outcome of an
engagement between two fighters. [Ref. 28] (See Appendix
A). The purpose of this approach is to remove the need for
individual creative thought during battle. Instead pilots
execute a scientifically computed combat maneuver against
their opponent.
To be successful, the scientific approach has to
conceive of every possible combat situation and determine
the scientific "best" solution to each situation. "Using
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the language of cybernetics" functional models representing
"not only one's own behavior, but also that of the adver-
sary" are made to represent reality. [ Ref . 28: p. 78] Here
the scientific method begins to break down. The task of
simulating or predicting all of reality or every combat
situation is impossible. Combat is not like the inevitable
path of history which Marxist-Leninist scientific approach
is based upon. Combat is unpredictable and Soviet tacti-
cians of the 50' s realized this. For example, "the situ-
ation can change suddenly even when the crew is aloft. The
flying personnel and commanders aloft will have to react
somehow to this change and make independent decisions. "
[Ref. 29] Thus, as the scientific approach was imposed upon
or implemented in Air Force units, it encountered resistance
from unit pilots. Elements of this resistance can be seen
in the articles in the Air Force Journal, such as the above
quotation, written by pilots who realized the futility of
trying to make pilots mechanical robots. It is evident that
those who resisted the scientific societies in their units
believed the scientific societies could extinguish
creativity in flying. To counter their arguments and resis-
tance, Guards Maj I. P. Pavlov wrote, "some still did not
understand the importance of military science work ... we
explained that science work not only contributes to the
creative growth of the officers but also helps solve prob-
lems of training and education. " [Ref. 27: p. 57] He goes
on to say that military science is the true source of inno-
vation and creativity in flying and through these societies
units and individual elements will be at a higher state of
combat readiness [Ref. 27: p. 59].
Despite Pavlov's arguments, pilots continued to
voice their dissatisfaction with the scientific approach.
In rebuffing Col Kudryashov's formula for predicting combat
mentioned earlier, articles were printed calling the
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scientific approach "an unjustified method." [ Ref . 30: p.
100. ] They challenged the quantification of all aspects of
flying on the grounds that a pilot's "personal qualities"
such as initiative can not be truly quantified. [ Ref. 30:
p. 100]
Such resistance to the scientific approach remains
in Air Force units today. In a 1983 Aviation and
Cosmonautics article "Tactics and Modeling, " the author
speaking on the practical application of scientific models
states, "some pilots greet some recommendations with skepti-
cism. " [ Ref. 24: p. 78] As a result of the continual
tension between the scientific approach and those who
favored continued creativity in fighter tactics, it is
believed a synthesis between these two schools of thought
evolved. The synthesis is most apparent in the writings of
early 1980' s; however this is simply the tail-end of the
long process of rise and decline of emphasis on initiative
that has taken place since the beginings of the Soviet Air
Force. Details of this process are developed at length in
subsequent chapters. The synthesis is a mixing of tradi-
tional fighter pilot techniques of initiative, creativity,
and gut instincts with scientific modeling to increase the
probability of success in an unknown situation. Speaking of
simulating a fight, Col. A Krasnov, a doctor of military
sciences, stated in 1982, "complete information does not and
will never exist. Therefore, the commander and pilot must
utilize fragmentary, obsolete information, experience and
intuition." [Ref. 31: p. 20] Also, other authors point out
"modeling of combat training missions ... is the search
for optimum solutions. " However, "modeling in no way
contradicts existing traditional techniques." [Ref. 32]
Also, the experiences of WWII are described in arti-
cles which synthesize creativity and science: "new tactics
were born right in combat, since in the air unforeseen
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situations frequently arose, situations which required
non-standard actions. Tactical discoveries, however, were
always made on the foundation of amassed experience. "
[ Ref . 24: p. 70] Again, the synthesis combines the emphasis
on traditional approach with scientific modeling. Modeling
is expressed as a way of gaining the "massed experience. "
Col Krasnov remarks that simulation of various phases of
flight is most helpful. "This method develops habits and
ability for analyzing a tactical situation, for assimilating
combat procedures better, for seeking innovations and for
displaying initiative. " [Ref. 31: p. 21] He goes on to say
that models and simulations can reduce as much as possible
the unknown factors in flying. "But no matter how complex
the mathematical procedures we may see, we can never calcu-
late everything today. " Also, "no mathematical tool and no
computer can eliminate or even reveal mistakes in the logic
of a pilot or commander. " Thus, he states the conclusive
synthesis:
The dialectics of decision making and development of the
different variants of combat fights are such that the
will, experience and intuition of the commander intert-
wine closely with strict and laborious calculations.
Unfortunately, we still encounter commanders who rely
only on common sense when they make their decisions and
develoo different variants of a combat assignment,
attempting to arrive at a quick solution without making
any calculations. Experience has shown that this leads
to stereotypic decisions and actions, and that sizeable
losses may result in a combat situation. [Ref. 31: p.
25]
This synthesis is a reflection of the changes in the
cultural environment and attitudes within which individual
creativity can be exercised. This background sheds some
light on the development, suppression, and revival of initi-
ative in the Soviet Air Force which is the heart of this
thesis.
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B. COMMAND AND CONTROL AND INITIATIVE
In addition to the ideological-scientific framework
surrounding initiative in military thinking, another aspect
of the Russian or Soviet concept of war impacting on flexi-
bility, creativity, and initiative in tactics or command
style is the command and control network of Soviet military
forces.
1. Centralized Control
The village Mir, mentioned earlier, is the cultural
origin of centralized command and control [ Ref . 33]. The
peasant villages were controlled by the small group of
village elders. The villages in turn were controlled by
land princes who formed a small circle of power centered
around the Tsar. Following the communist revolution and the
purges of Stalin, the government and military leadership was
made up primarily of men with peasant backgrounds.
Culturally, it is very natural for them to operate within a
centralized command and control system.
The Soviet command and control system reflects the
Russian culture. As Admiral Stansfied Turner said while
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, "The Soviets
have a command structure that goes all the way up the line
and is very tightly controlled because of the kind of
society they live in. " It is based on a top down concept
"with command and control highly centralized and largely
directed from Moscow. " [ Ref. 34: p. 58] Typically, the
first Secretary of the Communist Party is also commander-in-
chief of the military. This was the case with Stalin during
WWII.
Stalin s system of control during WWII when he was
concurrently Chairman of the State Committee of Defense
(GKO), Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
and General Secretary of the Communist Party is
described in Soviet texts as an ideal organizational
structure for any future war. [Ref. 19: p. 398]
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All power over the military centers on this one man and the
defense council. From the top down, tight lines of control
attempt to keep as much decision making power as high up the
chain of command as possible. "The rigid top- down approach
to C3 is evident throughout the Soviet military establish-
ment . . . control is maintained at the highest possible
level. " [Ref. 34: p. 61]
The centralized command and control system has
impacted the command style of pilots and low level
commanders in different ways depending upon the military
doctrine at the time. This has been reflected in the
doctrinal transitions under Stalin, the doctrinal change
with the coming of the nuclear era, the doctrinal shifts of
the late 1960's and reorganization in the late 1970 ' s to
early 80' s.
2. Stalin' s Era
Under Stalin's leadership, the command and control
changed several times. From 1937 to 1940, a dual command
system--political and military ran up and down the chain of
command. Political commissars held positions equal in
status with their military counterparts at the various
command levels. [Ref. 35: p. 91] The commissars fettered
the actions of the military commanders by hindering their
decision making based on their military expertise. The
system was not conducive to initiative nor was it effective
in managing military operations. In 1940, the system was
streamlined with the removal of the commissar. His position
was replaced by a political deputy subordinate to the mili-
tary commander. The command structure returned to a dual
system in 1941 and reverted back to a single command in
1942. [Ref. 35: p. 91] Stalin's vacillation ended with a
concentration of control in the hands of the Supreme High
Command or Stavka. This concentration of forces impacted on
the organization of the Air Forces.
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Prior to the 1942 reorganization, the Soviet Air
Forces were composed of five major components.
1) Aviation of the High Command (Aviatsiya Glavnogo
Komandovaniya) - long range bombing
2) Front Aviation ( Voyenno-Vozdushnuyye Sily Fronta) -
Air Forces of the military district and tronts
3) Army Aviation ( VVS Armii) - Air Forces of the Combined
Arms Army
4) Organic Aviation ( Voyskovaya Aviatsiya) - Air squad-
rons at corps, division and lower levels.
5) High Command Reserve. [ Ref . 36: p. 39]
With the reorganization, the Stavka established Long Range
Aviation ( LRA) (Aviatsiya dalnego deystriya, ADD) which
combined the bombers under their command with transports and
other bombers formerly assigned to frontal aviation. All
the bombers were now concentrated into LRA. In addition,
the front and army VVS ( Voyenno Vozdushnaya Sily) units were
combined into large groupings called air armies (Vozdushnaya
armiya or VA). Each front was given an air army whose
commander advised the front commander. The front commander
in turn responded directly to the plans of the Stavka. The
high command could now move easily, reallocate and concen-
trate the Air Force fire power in massive air operations.
[Ref. 36: p. 44] With the reorganization, air divisions
could no longer operate autonomously [Ref. 35: p. 141].
Centralized command and control made air power more respon-
sive on a large scale but reduced the amount of independent
decision making at lower levels. The large formations
involved in massive offensive operations had to strictly
follow the Stavka plans in order to integrate all the
participants.
During the Great Patriotic War, the theory and practice
of conducting aerial operations received further devel-
opment. These operations were conducted under unified
control, over a wide front, and with the involvement of
the powerful forces of Frontal Aviation. [Ref. 37]
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The use of overwhelming mass during WWII operations
necessitated the development of very centralized command and
control. To control the masses and remove as much chance as
possible, preplanning under the direction of the high
command was used. This preplanning and centralized control
remained the standard until the advent of nuclear weapons
and the death of Stalin.
3. Nuclear Era
The advent of nuclear weapons brought new doctrine
and science into Soviet military thinking. New doctrine
stated the next war between capitalism and socialism would
inevitably be nuclear. Military science determined the best
way to win this war was to be prepared to preempt any US
nuclear strike. "The Armed Forces of the Soviet Union . . .
must be prepared above all to wage war under the conditions
of the mass use of nuclear weapons. " [ Ref . 4: p. 193]
The destructive power of nuclear weapons meant "the
initial period of war will be of decisive importance for the
outcome of the entire war. " [Ref. 4: p. 210] Thus, to deal
with this problem, the command and control must be well
planned before the outbreak of hostilities. In this plan-
ning, the Soviets maintain their centralization.
Strategic operations of a future war will consist of
coordinated operations of the services of the Armed
Forces and will be conducted according to a common
concept and plan and under a single strategic direction.
Strategic operations are strictly correlated on the
basis of a single strategic plan with unified central -
ized command. [Ref. 4: p. 287]
Despite the plan for centralized control, the
Soviets are aware that under conditions of nuclear war,
communications may be disrupted and all command and control
lost. How will low level commanders function if they can no
longer receive orders from the high command? From a command
and control structure standpoint, the issue has not been
dealt with in Soviet writings.
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A solution to the loss of communications is a decen-
tralization of command. Authority would have to be dele-
gated to the lower level commanders and along with the
authority, commanders need to have the initiative to know
how and when to use their assets given the situation.
Structurally, the Soviet command system appears not to have
dealt with these problems until the reorganization in 1979.
Prior to that reorganization, doctrine made a return from
concentrating on nuclear war to once again thinking about
conventional war.
In the late 1960's, a doctrinal change about the
inevitability of nuclear war began to take place. The
Soviets continued to be prepared to fight a nuclear war;
yet, now their primary objective was to be able to throw the
US off the continent of Europe through a conventional
combined arms operation. 5 The return to emphasis on conven-
tional war allows the command and control network to remain
centralized. As stated in the Soviets' Dictionary of Basic
Military Terms , "centralized command and control is the
command and control principle recognized in the Armed
Forces. " However, it is interesting to note that the
dictionary goes on to include in the list of requirements
for troop command and control "flexibility and quickness of
reaction to changes in the situation. " [ Ref . 38] It is
postulated that as Soviet military leaders began to
re-examine conventional war and, at the same time, deal with
the problems nuclear war poses--that is to necessitate some
5 There is considerable debate in the intelliaence commu-
nity over the Soviets emphasis on nuclear or conventional
war. Professor Michael MccGuire of the Brookings Institute
pointed out in a 27 Feb 85 lecture that it is clear conven-
tional war is preferable to the Soviets over nuclear war and
that the major rebuilding and restructuring of the conven-
tional forces throughout the 1970 ' s is a good indication of
the Soviets' intentions to become capable of delivering a
conventional offensive blow to Western Europe.
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decentralization of command authority--a mixture of central-
ized control and allowance for decentralized execution and
initiative developed.
Note in Marshall Grechko ' s statement in 1975 (below)
the combination of technical solutions to command combined
with the officer's own ability to deal with a fast changing
situation. Such is the mixture of science, centralized
control, and personal initiative.
The task is to increase in every possible way the effi-
ciency of work, to expand the operational-tactical
outlook of commanders and staff officers, and to improve
their ability to act during tense and dynamic situations
with the complete and rational use of available tech-
nical means of control. [ Ref . 39]
One way in which the Soviets are building this
mixture is through improved automation/computerization of
the command and control network. The system,
Avtomatizirovannaeiia Sistema Upravleniia Voiskami( ASUV) is
an attempt to increase the volume of information coming to
isolated commanders in order to improve their decision
making capability. [Ref. 40] Such a system would allow a
faster response time and facilitate centralized control in a
fast paced conventional war.
In addition, the Soviets have reorganized the mili-
tary command and control lines recently which could facili-
tate the exercise of initiative at lower levels of command
and allow faster control from the top through automation.
This reorganization particularly affects Air Force opera-
tions. The new structure is basically the establishment of
a war time command organization during peace time. The new
organization is believed to contain the following entities:
1) Aviation of the High Command - primarily bombers
2) Aviation of the Front - fighters, fighter-bombers and
reconnaissance
3) Army Aviation - helicopters, ground attack aviation
[Ref. 41]
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The new organization is quite similar to the late WWII
command discussed earlier. The High Command has direct
access to its bomber force and front commanders may have
fast access to air power via short lines of control. Also,
air assets are now autonomously assigned to support army
units. Army commanders and perhaps even division commanders
operating with the Army Aviation commanders will be able to
allocate air power where they see fit. This short chain of
command allows fast reactions to a dynamic battle. Hand in
hand with this allocation of force must be the commander's
initiative and ability to assess the battle situation, make
a decision and act on it. An Army Division having its own
air power to operate independently is decentralized
authority, a good environment for initiative.
Thus, the new system is a mixture. It is a wartime
command network streamlined to allow centralized control by
the Stavka down through the front to the Army; yet, also
decentralized in its allocation of independent assets to the
lowest level. Such a decentralization may be an attempt to
be prepared in the event of a sudden nuclear war. The
assets and war command lines are in place as well as the
disposition to operate autonomously in the event of loss of
commands from the top. However, it is most likely not just
a preparation for lost C3 during nuclear war but a shift in
doctrinal principles.
It is postulated that this mixture of centralization
and decentralization is evidence of two approaches to
warfare that exist among the Soviet military leadership.
One approach is the centralized control school of thought.
This approach desires complete direction from the top and
thorough preplanning of all actions below. As will be
developed in detail in the following chapter, this school of
thought in the Soviet Air Force developed out of the large
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air operations of WWII. The other approach realizes the
need for decentralized control and initiative at the lower
levels. This group, as will be shown, originates with the
fighter pilots who survived WWII through their cunning and
initiative. The emergence of the latter school of thought
in a revised command and control system after nearly 40
years suggests that initiative has been kept alive in the
Soviet Air Force since the war and may have some renewed
influence in the current Soviet Air Force.
Having discussed the military-political culture as
well as command structure, the concepts of initiative and
flexibility shall be defined within the context of the
Soviet military.
4. Military Leader and Initiative
Fundamental to the Soviets' concept of initiative is
that an individual leader can be taught to think creatively
and with initiative [ Ref . 42: p. 6.]. Initiative is not
"native wit" but is part of a decision making choice. As
discussed earlier, the scientific solutions to as many prob-
lems as possible are modeled. To the Soviets one way initi-
ative is exercised is by chosing the correct decision for a
given situation among the ones already tested. For example,
in the Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms initiative
is defined as a creative decision based on situational char-
acteristics and a learned set of scenarios . [Ref. 42: pp.
8,9] Lt General K. Babenko said of initiative,
a commander reaches decisions on how to fulfill an order
by virtue of much creative work: analysis of all avail-
able data, meticulous calculation of each combat option,
comparison of these options, and the use of creative
imagination and intuition. [Ref. 43]
To the Soviets, repetitious exercises and contin-
gency planning aids development of initiative. Whereas in
the West, initiative is considered to be spontaneous,
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creative, original ideas less tied to a structure. In addi-
tion, contrary to a western concept, the Soviets believe
regulations improve success of initiative. "Firm knowledge
of regulations and a deep comprehension of their concepts is
the guarantee that in every situation each officer . . .
will be able to quickly evaluate the situation and make the
correct decision." [ Ref . 44]
However, even the Soviets appear to be willing to
put aside regulations and follow their own initiative if the
situation warrants it. For example, "procedures are
included in the regulations;" but if time and circumstances
do not permit it, then the regulations should not be
followed like a "blind alley. " Also, cunning, initiative
and self-reliance are rewards for those soldiers who
"refused to pay unimaginative and meaningless lip service to
formalistic regulations." [Ref. 45: p. 13] However, this is
not to say the Soviets condone complete individualism and
freedom of action. To the Soviets, the best kind of initia-
tive is informed and understands the overall context in
which a decision is being made. "Intelligent initiative" is
based on "deep analysis" and "taken in accordance with the
general plan of the superior commander. " [Ref. 45: p. 7] As
the soldier encounters unexpected or unforeseen situations,
he is expected to decide what to do in order to carry out
his assigned mission and that is through "intelligent
initiative." [Ref. 45: p. 14]
So it is within a slightly different context that
the Russians think of initiative. Yet, as will be evident
in the following chapters, their different approach to
initiative, creativity and flexibility has not kept them
from using it quite effectively. The Russians appear almost
paradoxical in terms of initiative. Culturally, centralized
control suppresses individual expression and should inhibit
initiative, but, at the same time, other environmental
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factors such as scarcity of food, supplies, survival itself
have forced many to be very creative and innovative in order
to survive. Therefore the extreme generalization that
Soviet citizens do not think for themselves and lack initia-
tive is false. Some of the world's greatest composers and
inventors have come from Russian culture. The result of
initiative and creative thought is the same as in the west;
however, the thought process and culture surrounding the
exercise of initiative in the Soviet Union appears
different.
A model was constructed to illustrate the paradox-
ical operation of initiative in Soviet military decision
making. The model shows the process of combining what could
be considered in the West environmental elements which
restrain initiative (inhibitors) and those elements which
encourage initiative (inducers). Elements of inhibition
have been discussed in the context above. 6 They include:
the rigors of the scientific approach to problem solving,
including the modeling of tactics and rigorous repetition
flying only the same approved tactics over and over; strict
discipline and adherence to regulations; cultural percep-
tions on individualism, group decision making, and central-
ized control resulting in a constricting C3 network. The
inducers of initiative are: being approached by a new and
unknown situation to which no scientific solution has been
memorized; the instinct for survival during combat; func-
tioning autonomously when command and control is cut off
during nuclear war and decentralized command and control;
combat or even daily operations when scarcity of supplies
require one to use initiative to survive.
6 For a detailed discussion on these elements and the
process of initiative in the Soviet military with compari-
sons made to Western concepts of initiative, see Initiative
and Innovation in the Soviet Mi li tary , Zey-Ferrell
,
Parchman, and Gaston, Texas A&i>I, 1984, particularly pp.
21-27 and 37-43.
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These two poles within the framework of the decision
making environment form the elements to be drawn upon for a
decision. When faced with a situation requiring an indepen-
dent action, a decision maker can draw on the elements of
inhibition or inducement and uniquely combine them. The
result is an observable action which indicates the presence
or absence of initiative and which elements dominated the
decision makers frame of mind. (See Figure 2.2). In some
cases the combination of positive and negative result in
stereotypical actions. Whereas in other cases new, innova-
tive, independent actions are a result of a combination with
initiative involved. As will be seen in subsequent chap-
ters, Soviet Air Force officers have a history of combining







•Creative Solutions to Problems
Continued Operations Under Severe
Conditions
Independent Individual Actions
Figure 2. 2 Initiative Model.
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III. INITIATIVE DEVELOPED IN WWII
World War II was a period of change and development for
the Soviet Air Force. During those four years of battle on
the Eastern Front the Russians became an awesome fighting
force which defeated the German Luftwaffe. The Soviets
developed in two major areas impacting upon their command
style. They broke out of their stereotyped tactics by
developing fighter pilot independence and initiative and, at
the same time, they developed the art of detailed planning
for large air operations. At the end of the war, the
Russians possessed both free flowing, flexible tactics and
minutely planned air operations involving hundreds of
aircraft. Although initiative and detailed planning seem to
be contradictory methods of fighting, combat is not an
'either or' situation and the two concepts can be synthes-
ized to operate together. This chapter traces the develop-
ment of initiative in Soviet Air Force tactics during WWII.
First a general history of the Soviet Air Force prior to
WWII is covered to describe the roots of initiative existing
in the Soviet Air Force despite its overall rigid fighting
style at the outset of WWII. Then the progressive develop-
ment of initiative in fighter tactics is shown through the
years as the Soviet Air Force gained air superiority and
defeated the Luftwaffe. Finally, for comparison with the
Soviet concepts of planning and initiative, western air
operations and tactical air doctrine during WWII are briefly
discussed. This shows differences and similarities between
Western and Soviet air doctrine and initiative and is




Prior to WWII, the Soviet Air Force had been involved in
the Russian Civil War (1918-1922), the Spanish Civil War
(1936-1937), the Russo-Japanese conflict (1939), and the
Russian-Finnish conflict (1940). Each of these conflicts
influenced the nature of the Red Air Force that entered into
combat against Nazi Germany in 1941. After coming to power
in 1917, V. I. Lenin is said to have shown "great concern for
the formation of the Red Air Fleet." [ Ref . 46: p. 82]
Throughout the Civil War the Air Fleet supported small oper-
ations with elementary air defense reconnaissance, and dive
bombing operations [Ref. 47: p. 50]. Although the contri-
bution of the air forces to the overall success of the civil
war is considered insignificant, some basic tenants of air
power were developed, such as, subordinating air units to
ground forces, centralizing command and control of large
formations and stressing mobility in air operations. The
civil war gave new Soviet leaders the opportunity to modify
the tactics and air doctrine they inherited from the
Imperial Air Force. [Ref. 47: pp. 49, 50, 60-62] Also,
during this period, the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute
(TsAGI), Zhukovskiy Air Academy, 7 and the "Friends of the
Russian Air Force" Osoaviakhim 8 were established.
7Professor N. YE. Zhukovskiy was called by Lenin the
"Father of Russian Aviation. " His institute lormed the
foundation for "creating a scientific basis for modern avia-
tion in training pilots, engineers, and designers,"
( Stroyev, p. 85)
8 It is interesting to note that the aero clubs created
under Osoaviakhim in 1923 had a million members within two
years, 3 million by 1927 and 11 million by 1933. These
clubs found that the "standard Russian had good technical
aptitude" for flying. (This is significant in that many
Western analysts believe that because Russians have less
exposure to owning automobiles, driving, and other skills
common in the West, which may enhance t lying capabilities
(they have less an aptitude for flying. ) However, the rapid
growth in size and potential capability was not paralleled
with an improvement in training or increased air force
recruitment. Thus, there were many Doorly trained aviators
when there was potential for many well trained flyers. ( See
Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force in the Eves of German
Commanders
,
Arno Press, T9~60~~] p. b ancPBoyd, A. THe Soviet
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Russia developed its own air force institutions and drew
upon the assistance of the German Luftwaffe. During the
1920' s, Russian Air Force officers were given German general
staff courses conducted by the Reich's Ministry of Defense
in Berlin. In 1924, a German Reichwehr aviation training
school was established within Russia at Lipetsk ( 150 miles
south of Moscow). The experienced gained by the Germans in
developing tactics and doctrine in the Soviet Union were
passed directly to the Russians. Thus, the Red Air Force
developed as an auxiliary to the Army and Navy as did the
Luftwaffe. And, perhaps more important, the Russians became
intimately familiar with the best of "western" tactical
thought. [ Ref . 48: p. 1] This influence is seen in the
tactical reorganization of the Air Force in 1923. The
Russian standard flight (Otryad) of six aircraft was
replaced by an element ( zveno ) of three aircraft which was
also the German standard at that time [Ref. 35: p. 21].
Through the 1920 's and 30 's the political bureaucracy
and collective leadership began to take its toll on the
operational efficiency of the Soviet Air Forces [Ref. 47: p.
78] . However, Soviet training continued to import lessons
from "tactical geniuses such as Valery Chkalov" and the
training doctrine remained flexible and ready to "adapt
necessary changes." [Ref. 47: pp. 88-89.] By 1933 the Red
Air Force had grown to an impressive size of 2000 aircraft
but still their command structure held back their overall
standards [Ref. 48: pp. 6, 7].
In 1936, the Red Air Force augmented the Loyalist forces
in Spain. However, the Russians ignored prearranged plans
of the Loyalists and fought independently as they saw fit.
[Ref. 47: p. 144] In Spain, the Russian ground forces devel-
oped completely new doctrines of war fighting theory known
as "Battle in Depth" [Ref. 49: p. 92]. Air power developed
Air Forces since 1918 , Stein and Day, N. Y. , 1977, p. 16. )
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purely as an auxiliary to the ground forces and was not used
for strategic bombing missions. Operating off a large
network of austere airfields near the front, air commanders
learned the importance of surprise, mobility, flexibility,
concentration of forces and deception. [ Ref . 47: p. 147] In
air tactics, both the Germans and the Soviets developed
fluid flying; a flight changed from a three ship formation
to four-ship formations of two two-ship elements for mass
and flexibility. The three ship formation had proven too
rigid and constricted tactics. The two ship formation
allowed good maneuverability; two-two ships combined gave
adequate fire power and mutual protection of elements in the
formation. [Ref. 50: p. 151] Germans flying against the
Russians noted that although the Red Air Force was not as
capable as the Luftwaffe, they did master some of their
problems through improvisations such as camouflage.
[Ref. 43: p. 45]
These important lessons from their experiences in Spain
along with those from technical experiments in the Soviet
Union during the 30' s with four engine bombers, armored
ground attack aircraft, mass paratroop drops and "many other
innovative projects" were lost during Stalin's 1937 purge of
military leadership [Ref. 50: p. 151]. The survivors of the
purge were either innocuous leaders or political appointees
concerned more with their survival in the system than
improving tactical air doctrine. The sterility and stagna-
tion in leadership caused by the purge was most heavily felt
during the conflict with Finland in 1940. Although going
against little opposition, the Soviet bomber force had poor
results due to their inadequate training. The Russians lost
750-900 aircraft while the Finns lost only 60-70 [Ref. 35:
p. 90] . The Germans also observed Soviet performance
against Finland and made these assessments:
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in light of events in Russo-Finnish war, training
standards seemed low in coordinated action with ground
forces . . . the command was considered awkward, old
fashioned, and inclined toward stereotype
methods .... [ Ref . 48: p. 12]
The Soviet general staff was not pleased with the results of
the Russo-Finnish campaign and began a far reaching reorgan-
ization of the Red Army [Ref. 51: p. 77].
Following the Russo-Finnish war, the Soviets reorganized
the air force command structure by placing a political
commissar in equal status with the military commander. 9 The
dual command system reduced initiative and led to dogmatism
and conformity. To perform routine operations was a major
bureaucratic task as all operations orders required the
signatures of the commanding officer, chief of staff, and
political commissar. [Ref. 50: p. 81] Any flexibility in
leadership which had been developed in Spain was completely
lost.
These problems of ridgedness and stereotypical actions
made their way down the chain of command into aircrew
training at that time. For example, trainees learned forma-
tion flying by observing and reacting to hand or wing move-
ment signals given by the squadron leader "with no
encouragement to develop personal judgement or initiative.
"
[Ref. 35: p. 95] Soviet manuals placed a special emphasis on
formation flight training at the expense of other tactical
flying. As a result, instrument (blind) and night flying
was not mastered by the majority of Soviet pilots. Pilots
were apprehensive about flying new aircraft and in unfa-
miliar environments and the overall communications systems
for controlling pilots were "unsuited for flexible conduct
9 This dual command system had been established in 1937.
In 1940 the commissar was replaced with a political deputy
subordinate to the unit commander. In 1941 the dual command
system was revised and in 1942, the single chain of command
was once again instituted and has remained ever since. ( see
Boyd, p. 91).
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of air warfare." [ Ref . 48: p. 32] [ Ref . 35: p. 96] Most
significantly, individual aircraft crews could be "employed
only conditionally in independent missions since they had
lost the faculty for independent thought and action because
of excessive training in formation flying. " [ Ref. 48: pp.
25-26]
In short, the Red Air Force on the eve of a German inva-
sion appeared as easy prey to the Luftwaffe. The German Air
Force High Command assumed "that many of the Soviet pilots
would be brave but lacking in initiative, and so ineffective
in individual combat, because they were trained to develop a
sense of dependency on the community and on orders from
above. " [Ref. 52: p. 51] Any building innovations had been
cut off four years prior to the German attack and the
spreading political bureaucracy had stifled initiative to
the point of crippling the Red Air Force before it was even
attacked.
B. WORLD WAR II
Coverage of events during WWII is not intended to be an
exhaustive history of the war. Instead, the lack of initia-
tive at the outset of war and subsequent development of
initiative by the Soviet Air Force is described. Initiative
and flexibility can be seen in the tactics and command style
from both the Soviet and German perspective. For this
discussion, WWII has been divided into four phases:
Barbarossa-Summer 1941; Autumn 1941-Summer 1942; Summer
1942-1943; and, 1944-1945. Phase one is characterized by
confusion and retreat. Phase two is primarily defensive
actions to save Moscow and the rebuilding of the air force.
Phase three begins the Soviets' major offensives; the missed
attempt to free Leningrad in the summer offensive 1942 and
the successful retaking of Stalingrad and offensive in the
Kharkov-Orel sector. Phase four is Operation Begration, the
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Belorussian campaign, and the invasion and defeat of
Germany. In each phase, Soviet airmen become a more
capable, flexible fighting force and at the same time, the
air operations become larger, requiring more detailed plan-
ning and centralized control. While the primary focus of
this thesis is initiative in fighter tactics, the develop-
ment of bomber tactics during the war is also presented
because of their overall impact on soviet air force develop-
ment in the years following the war.
1. Operation Barbarossa - Summer 1941
On June 22, 1941, the Germans launched their
Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union. In the attack, 66
airfields containing 70 percent of the Red Air Force were
struck [ Ref . 35: p. 108]. Under the direction of Beria, new
airfields were being built and runways lengthened at the
time of the attack [Ref. 53: p. 141]. A large number of
airfields were being worked on simultaneously which forced a
concentration of fighters and fighter bombers on a limited
number of airfields without proper disposal or camouflage
[Ref. 54: pp. 476-77]. The Red Air Force was caught by
surprise in an extremely vulnerable position. 10
Just two and a half hours prior to the attack,
instructions from Moscow ordered the dispersal and conceal-
ment of aircraft. Indicative of the restrictive nature of
the command system at the time, the order went on to read,
"no other measures are to be taken without specific instruc-
tions. " [Ref. 54: Vol II] [Ref. 35: p. 108] Paralyzed from
within, the Red Air Force suffered heavy losses.
The Luftwaffe attacked with approximately 2000
aircraft [Ref. 14: p. 33]. By noon, the Soviets lost 1200
aircraft and in the course of the day, nearly 1500 aircraft
10 There has been some speculation that Beria was a
German operative and that he purposefully placed the Red Air
Force in a compromising position to ensure a German victory.(See Werth, p. 141)
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had been destroyed on the ground alone [ Ref . 35: p. 110]
.
At the end of the first week of battle, Goering announced
that the Soviets had lost 4990 aircraft while the Luftwaffe
had lost only 179 [Ref. 14: p. 41].
This obliteration of the Red Air Force can in some
measure be explained by the element of surprise. However,
the observations of German commanders and pilots who took
part in the battle as well as the comments of Soviet pilots
who fought indicates that the inflexible tactics and unima-
ginative fighting also played a significant role in the
Germans' success. Field Marshall Albert Kesselring
commented on the slaughter, saying:
I watched the battle with the Russian heavy bombers
coming from the depths of Russia. It seemed almost a
crime to allow those floundering aircraft to be attacked
in tactically impossible formation. One flight after
another came in innocently at regular intervals, easy
prey for our fighters. It was sheer infanticide.
[Ref. 55] also [Ref. 56: p. 10]
Col Von Beust remarked, "it is well known Soviet unit's had
to follow their unit leader into action, suiting their
actions to his, like machines, without any knowledge of
their target, route or enemy situations." [Ref. 48: p. 57]
Soviet bombers were known for holding to their course
regardless of the losses going on around them [ Ref. 57: p.
221] . Luftwaffe pilots noted that Soviet air formations
became confused and usually turned back once the formation
leader was shot down. This was contributed to the fact that
only the Soviet unit leaders were furnished maps and briefed
the units mission. [Ref. 48: p. 128] and [Ref. 35: p. 95]
Such tight controls gave Soviet pilots absolutely no chance
to develop or display initiative or innovations at the
outset of war. The Soviet command was paralyzed from Stalin
on down and this in turn paralyzed the Red Air Force.
[Ref. 57: p. 213] The air leadership was often aimless,
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rigid in outlook, and lacking in effective coordination
[ Ref . 52: p. 51]. In the weeks that followed Barbarossa,
"the Russian Air Forced appeared to be paralyzed; only small
units, appearing at very infrequent intervals, participated
in combat actions, and most of these were uncoordinated and
unsystematic." [Ref. 14: p. 39]
The rigidness and lack of initiative that was char-
acteristic of the Soviet Air Force during the first several
months of fighting can be clearly seen in the fighter,
ground attack, and bomber tactics. Fighter tactics were
primarily defensive. Soviet pilots were known to abandon
the bombers they escorted. The principle formation was the
three ship which had earlier been rejected by the experience
in Spain. Soviet fighters would only engage the Germany
fighters when they outnumbered them. Even when attacking,
the standard formation was the defensive circle . In
dogfights, the Soviets would panic and dive low to escape.
Roughly 90 percent of the fighters shot down were lost over
Russian territory indicating their lack of aggressiveness.
Pilots were not willing to accompany their own bombers or
attack German bombers before they reached Russian territory.
In some cases, Russian fighters would pretend to intercept
German aircraft, performing mock combat several thousand
feet below the German fighters to put on a display for their
commanders below. [Ref. 14: p. 184] Flying the same tactics
at the same time of day - day after day - the "Soviet airmen
were not good at independent air combat. " [ Ref. 48: p. 66
also, pp. 65-91]
The only element of tactics that remotely resembles
initiative during the first phase of the war is that of
ramming. From the first day of combat, pilots of obsoles-
cent fighters fighting against the German Bf-109 rammed the
enemy aircraft out of desperation. The first pilot who
rammed was made into a national hero. That the pilot
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thought of the tactic himself and executed it on its own
demonstrated that initiative and Russian creativity could
surface when severely threatened.
Ground attack aircraft and fighter bombers were
"aggressive, courageous, and determined;" yet, they lacked
"initiative and versatility." [ Ref . 48: p. 108] Aircraft
made their attacks using a flat curve approach in a tight
in-line formation. No evasive maneuvers were made despite
heavy anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Attacks on highways
were repeatedly made at right angles to the road. (This
means less exposure to any vehicular traffic on the road and
therefore results in much lower kills for a strafing run. )
Attack runs on most targets were designed to give the
fighter-bombers the shortest egress route back to their side
of the front. The attack tactics "lacked variety and flexi-
bility so that attacking units suffered unnecessary heavy
losses." [Ref. 48: pp. 111-123]
Bomber pilots showed the least amount of flexi-
bility. As already mentioned, only the lead pilot was given
instructions and the elements in the formation followed
along as lemmings. Formations were normally tight, 6-8
aircraft. Attacks were straight and level with little or no
maneuvering to avoid AAA. The formation would stay with the
same spacing regardless of the losses being inflicted.
Fighter escort of bombers was attempted unsuccessfully. The
largest formations for early air operations was roughly 40
aircraft. [Ref. 48: pp. 114-131]
The initiative and flexibility demonstrated by the
tactics for the first period of the war is summarized in
Figure 3.1 In phase one Soviet tactics were rudimentary and
restrictive. Individual pilots had to follow their
commanders blindly and unit commanders had to wait for
orders from on high. The Germans encountered these same
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TACTICS INITIATIVE
1. Fighter - Three ship flight - None
- Stereo-typed - Inflexible
- Defensive circle
- Horizontal maneuvers -(-,-)
2. Ground _ Unimaginative
Attack - Stereo-typed
- Flat curve attacks -(-,-)
3. Bomber _ Straight and level
- Lead only informed
- Tight, inflexible -(-,-)
— Small operations
4. Air - Small (40 aircraft) -no effect
Operations
A ( - ) indicates
a ( + ) will indie
i:ihibition of initiative,
;a te tactics
conducive to using initiative.
Figure 3.1 Soviet Tactics June 1941-Summer 1941.
tactics throughout the summer of 1941 as the German Army
made its way to the steps of Moscow. In the first three
months of war the Soviets lost 7500 aircraft [ Ref . 58: p.
29]. However, the majority of these aircraft were lost on
the ground during the initial Blitzkrieg. The months of
fighting had also cost the Luftwaffe dearly. By the end of
September, the Luftwaffe had lost 1603 aircraft and had 1028
additional aircraft damaged [ Ref. 57: p. 377] . Despite the
Luftwaffe's clear tactical and command superiority, the
victories had not been easy and had cost many German lives.
German fighter pilots recalled some of the harrowing moments
of combat: ". . . they would let us get almost into an
aiming position, then bring their machines around a full 180
degrees, till both aircraft were firing at each other head
on." [Ref. 57: p. 220] The Germans had already gained a
year's combat experience from the Battle of Britain (June
1940-June 1941) which cost them 1733 aircraft. In one
fourth the time against the Soviets, the Luftwaffe had
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sustained similar losses - attesting to the ferocity of the
battle on the Eastern front and the staying power of the
Russians.
At the beginning of the campaign the "German Air
Force swept the Soviet Air Force from the skies and
destroyed nearly all its obsolete aircraft. " [ Ref . 14: p.
252] Following Hitler's detour into the Ukraine and the
delay in taking Moscow, the Soviet Air Force was given a
chance to rebuild and regroup. The Germans' lack of a four
engine bomber left Soviet aircraft production relatively
intact. The Soviets were given a second chance to change
their doctrine and tactics. Slowly, in late 1941 the
changes began to take place and with these changes came "the
beginning of the death of the German Air Force. " [ Ref. 14:
p. 253]
2. Autumn 1941 - Summer 1942
The defense of Moscow in the Autumn of 1941 was the
beginning of the Soviet Air Force's loosening up and devel-
opment of initiative. The Germans noted signs of recovery
"especially at the focal points of the main ground opera-
tions. " [Ref. 52: p. 53] The Soviets realized in the begin-
ning of the war tactics were primarily defensive as the Army
was on the retreat. Subsequently, appropriate changes began
to be made in their air tactics and employment. Part of
these changes involved the loosening of restrictions and
encouragement of independent actions. The changes took
place in both the upper and lower levels of command.
In the upper levels the command structure was decen-
tralized in the Summer of 1941. Combat had shown that
combined-arms staffs could not handle the vast number of
tasks before them. Therefore, the staffs of the various
services were given independent operational responsibilities
and separate staffs were established to manage the
organization of the rear, supply, etc. [ Ref. 59: p. 24]
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Also, the Air Force realized "there was considerable trouble
too in the tactical control of air units and groups.
"
[ Ref . 60: p. 69] Not enough aircraft were under the direct
control of the front commander which limited efforts for
concentrating air power.
In tactics elements of initiative also became mani-
fest, however, fighter tactics lagged behind ground attack
tactics. Pilots still fought horizontal engagements prima-
rily due to lack of power and their lack of combat experi-
ence. Marshal of Aviation A. I. Pokryshkin points out that
horizontal combat is "ultimately a defensive tactic and a
passive one. " He goes on to say combat forced Soviet avia-
tors to seek out new tactics. The result was the develop-
ment of vertical tactics and new combat formations. The new
formations consisted of the two plane element since the
three ship formation "impeded maneuvering in combat. " As
Marshal Pokryshkin stated, "This was innovation. I now know
that simultaneously with me but on other fronts many pilots
were flying in pairs." [Ref. 61: p. 45] The pair of
aircraft (zveno-para) allowed for the future development of
greater tactical flexibility however, because radio was not
yet widely distributed for controlling fighters, "all maneu-
vers in aerial combat were executed on the basis of variants
worked out in advance." [Ref. 62: p. 64] Also, fighters
normally made one attack pass because "repeated attacks
seldom succeeded in downing the enemy. " [ Ref. 60: p. 70]
Therefore, restrictive elements remained in fighter tactics.
Innovation and initiative developed as men like
Pokryshkin began drawing sketches of his dogfight engage-
ments, trying to compute what had happened and develop
better tactical solutions. Pilots gathered in his airdrome
dugout which was covered with these charts and diagrams and
listened to his explanations of German tactics and ways to
defeat them. [Ref. 63: p. 90] His initiative to analyze and
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teach tactics resulted in the 5th Fighter Regiment becoming
a crack unit and 30 of the pilots he trained becoming heroes
of the Soviet Union [ Ref . 63: p. 81]. More extensive inno-
vations took hold in fighter tactics in 1942; however, in
Autumn of 1941, the basis and elements of initiative were
beginning to surface.
In ground attack tactics, aircraft began attacking
targets independently without fighter cover. Fighter
bombers began ingressing at "hedge hopping" level. Bombs
were released on a signal from lead or "each crew dropped
them independently with individual sighting. " However, in
all cases, the commander of a subunit was the lead aircraft
and he maintained his position throughout the fight.
[Ref. 62: p. 64] Further innovations included using smoke or
cloth panels to mark the forward edge of their own troops
when there were not enough resources to establish a command
post in an area. In some instances, mission briefings were
given to entire unit's and not to flight lead only as had
been the case previously. Also, some attacks took place
without "a leader-plane or leading formation." [Ref. 64: p.
65]
In bombers during the Battle for Moscow, the tactics
began to show innovations by varying between escorted and
unescorted missions and by closely coordinating attacks with
ground attack fighter-bombers. Bombers would precede ground
attack strikes on an airfield and mark the targets for
following ground attack aircraft. By cleverly varying the
altitudes, ingress routes, and fighter escort locations, the
Soviets were able to confuse airfield air defenses and
destroy German aircraft on the ground. [Ref. 64: p. 65]
Overall, the period of late 1941 was marked with a
growth in aggressiveness and overall standards.
Improvements began to increase in 1942 as the fronts were
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engaged in primarily defensive actions until the German
offensive near Kharkov. The defense of Moscow invigorated
Soviet morale and bought them time; time to continue
rebuilding and reorganizing.
In rebuilding the forces over the Winter of
1941-1942, the Russian Army swelled to over 4 and a half
million men. In 1942 the Russians produced 25,000 aircraft
for just one front while the Germans produced 15,000 for
three fronts. [ Ref . 65: p. 55] Germany thought the Soviet
Union had exhausted its reserves by 1942. As General
Reinhard Gehlen put it, "Thanks to their not unexpected
talent for improvisation, and to the endemically rigorous
qualities of the Soviet State, Moscow had succeeded in mobi-
lizing several million men in new divisions." [Ref. 66: p.
51] The Soviet leadership faced with a great threat to their
survival, showed their ability to innovate in this type of
environment. With more men and machines Stalin reorganized
the command and control to increase strategic flexibility in
battle management as previously discussed. A separate
command for bombers (Long Range Aviation) ADD, was created
directly beneath the Stavka for placement of bomber aircraft
within the entire theater. The Stavka also directed the
allocation of the new strategic reserve of forces. These
forces comprised 43% of the total air assets and were made
up of entire units that would be inserted at critical loca-
tions. Overall, the new organization increased the stra-
tegic flexibility of the Red Air Force by increasing its
mobility and concentration capabilities. Now the Stavka had
an entire range of options to choose from in meeting the
threat and developing offensive air operations. [ Ref. 65:
pp. 52-53] Through a process of "desperate trial and serious
error, " Stalin had improvised an operational command system
which had centralized strategic direction and decentralized
battle management [Ref. 67: p. xi] . Decentralized battle
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management is another step towards developing an environment
for commanders to use initiative.
Over the Winter of 1941-1942 the "greatest deficien-
cies in flying ability, operational procedures, organiza-
tion, and command and staff methods had been eliminated.
"
[ Ref . 48: p. 192] To the Germans, the Soviet fighters began
to develop into tremendous adversaries. The loss ratio of
the Soviets began to decline as a result. Fighters were
gradually made into an elite force and the best units of any
type aircraft became known as "guards" units to instill
pride and boost morale.
In the first half of 1942, the zveno-para or two
ship became more the standard fighter formation because of
its greater tactical flexibility and tactics in the vertical
plane began to be developed. Fighter bombers began flying
in flights of 4 (two pairs) and the formation began to shift
from a wedge to in line and row formations. Overall, the
period of Autumn 1941 to Summer 1942 was a time of growth,
learning and adaptation. If at the outset of war the Red
Air Force could barely crawl, it was now beginning to take
its first steps. Figure 3.2 summarizes the tactics and
initiative for this second period of the war.
3. Summer 1942 through 1943
From the Summer of 1942 and throughout 1943, the
Soviet Air Forces grew in number and capabilities. In 1942,
25,400 aircraft were built and in 1943, 35,000 more flew
into combat [Ref. 68: pp. 20, 22]. Air superiority in 1942
remained with the Germans but through 1943 the Russians
seized the initiative in the air [Ref. 48: p. 170]. The
Soviet pilots began showing more signs of flexibility and
offensive, aggressive combat. Their adaptability was espe-
cially noticeable in the intermediate command levels;






























Figure 3.2 Autumn 1941 - Summer 1942.
still lacked self reliance and flexibility. The Battle of
Stalingrad "proved clearly that Russian aviation matched
that of the Germans who had lost their earlier superiority,
"
and, after the Battle of Kursk the Russians definitely "led
in the air." [ Ref . 48: pp. 168, 172]
The Red Air Force had learned one of the basic prin-
ciples of combat, concentration of forces. Stalin's
Strategic Reserve Forces and Air Armies were used to mount
overwhelming superiority in numbers opposite the main battle
area while other parts of the front were sparsely covered.
Instead of being fixed in one location, the reserve could be
moved flexibly across the front. "This did not guarantee
permanent air supremacy but it would help to give local and
temporary supremacy for a particular battle. " [ Ref. 65: p.
53] The concentration of forces became the doctrine of the
air offensive.
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According to the defeated Germans, the Russians
adopted German tactics and flexible command style.
Russians can credit their great victories to the fact
that they applied standard German command principles:
Zhukov as military commander enjoys complete freedom
within the framework of the task assigned to him . . .
in the meantime, we (Germans) have borrowed from the
Russians their earlier system of rigidly laying down the
law on virtually everything and going into the finest
details, and therein lies the blame for our defeats.
[ Ref . 66: p. 60]
The increasing efficiency of the Red Air Force along
with its growing size, improving tactics, and offensive
nature seriously hampered the effectiveness of the
Luftwaffe. At the bottom of all of this was the growing
initiative of the pilots. "Through the initiative of the
commander and flying personnel the shortcomings revealed in
combat were eliminated." [Ref. 62: p. 65] All combat forma-
tions echeloned in altitude for better observation and
freedom of action. Formations became more open and fluid
for maneuverability and mutual support. For both fighters
and ground attack, the two ship element became the standard.
In fighter tactics, the two ship loosened up to give
wide frontal spacing and aircraft would alternate between
attack and cover positions. "Free Hunt" patrols of aircraft
operating in groups of 3-4 pairs or even single ship lone
wolf patrols became common. The free hunting aircraft oper-
ated independently and necessitated initiative. Pilots were
given their own sectors to search both over Soviet territory
and deep into enemy territory. They sought out enemy
fighters and engaged them independently.
Air defense patrols over the battle area were
hampered by lack of radar and fighter director posts; but,
in the Battle of Stalingrad radio became the basic means of
control for fighter aircraft [Ref. 62: p. 67]. Senior
commanders would give airborne fighters information on the
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aerial situation and vectors for interception. This became
especially prevalent at the battle in the Kuban and resulted
in the development of a stacked formation of fighters.
Elements were echeloned 600-800 meters above offset toward
the sun to increase the element of surprise when attacking.
Another new tactic for fighter cover was the devel-
opment of a "free maneuvering group" of fighters. A fighter
cover group escorting bombers or ground attack aircraft
would fly above and behind the attack aircraft. Even higher
was positioned the "free maneuvering group" consisting of a
pair or flight of aircraft. These reserve aircraft were
committed by the commander's decision or they could operate
on its own discretion. [ Ref . 69: p. 12] Fighters operating
on their own in either "free hunt" or as a "free maneuvering
group" had to be able to make independent decisions and act
on their own initiative. As more pilots were exposed to
this type of fighting, independent decision making and
initiative became more a part of the population of Soviet
fighter pilots.
The development of independent initiative began
manifesting itself in the actions of wingmen. Wingmen were
no longer robots awaiting the orders from the formation
lead. Instead they gave mutual support and took the initia-
tive in engagements. For example, Lt Gen of the Air Force
(ret) N. S. Romazonav in his war memoirs describes an
instance during which one fighter breaks away from a group
and engaged a group of nine enemy aircraft [Ref. 70: p. 85].
In another instance, a wingman independently chose to attack
a group of German bombers head-on as his lead went low to
make a reattack on the rear [Ref. 71: p. 93], Such initia-
tive was apparently becoming prevalent to the point of
breaking down flight discipline and group integrity.
Training of new pilots in fighter units then dealt with this
problem by balancing independence with obedience.
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Training in 1943 devoted much attention to tactics
of group actions and instilling in wingmen their duty to
cover their lead unless released to engage separately.
"Remember once and for all, if the flight lead gives the
order 'follow me,' go! And don't think about busying your-
selves with some discovery or other of your own. " [ Ref . 71:
p. 98]
By the Soviets' own admission the loners that sepa-
rated from their leaders "mainly became the victim of the
German fighters. " [Ref. 72: p. 62] They continued to empha-
size the need for mutual support. At the same time, it was
important that pilots develop their tactical mind and think
independently. [Ref. 61: p. 48] Regiments gathered together
to discuss individuals' 'secrets' of success. The exchange
of ideas encouraged independent thinking and actions. These
gatherings differed from the 'scientific society' meetings
because combat solutions from individual initiative were
being exchanged for adaptation, modification, and applica-
tion as a given pilot or commander saw fit; rather than a
common 'scientific' solution being dictated to a group of
pilots.
In addition, a great deal of attention was given to
training leadership in air regiments and squadrons. Three
day courses were held for commanders to discuss tactics and
operations problems creatively. [Ref. 72: p. 103] The
result was the defeat of Luftwaffe pilots "cleverly and with
tactical competence. " [ Ref. 70: p. 90]
A German pilot shot down during the battle of Kursk
said of Soviet pilots: "The main thing is that you have no
set pattern in tactical methods. Each time one is
confronted with a new surprise. " [Ref. 70: p. 91] The
Luftwaffe believed Russian fighters were becoming increas-
ingly aggressive—seeking out fights--and "this meant
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considerable damage from 1941." [ Ref . 48: p. 197] Guards
fighters were considered experts in individual fighting.
The attack and cover elements alternated the attack in the
dogfight. Dogfights became more and more common and the
Russians developed a "sure flair for German weaknesses.
"
Offensively minded and tactically skilled, the Soviet
fighters were no longer inferior to the Luftwaffe's
challenge. [Ref. 48: pp. 197-200]
Finally, to increase striking power of an attack
force, fighters were being fitted with bombs to attack
ground targets. The pilot made the decision whether or not
to jettison the bomb for a dogfight and which target to
attack with the ordnance. [ Ref. 71: p. 70]
As the fighters developed initiative, elements of
centralized control increased, also. The small details of
placement of fighter patrols, etc. normally established by
Division and Regiment commanders were dictated from high up
the chain of command in some cases. During the Battle of
Stalingrad, "the organization of fighter ambushes was
directed personally by the commander of the 16th Air Army,
Gen S.I. Redenko. " [Ref. 72: p. 24] However, his planning
probably did not prescribe tactics, only location of
fighters and their primary objectives.
In ground attack operations, the size of the attack
group began to grow from small groups to entire squadrons
and regiments operating against a given objective. In 1943,
air divisions and entire corps were operating in massed air
strikes. However, the size of the operations did not stop
the innovation of new tactics. The "circle of death" was
developed and used extensively during the Battle of Kursk.
This tactic involved two flights of ground attack planes
alternating attacks on tanks while maintaining continuous
fire on the targets and mutual support between crews.
[Ref. 69: pp. 16-17. ]
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New formations included echeloned line astern which
permitted greater flexibility. Fighters ingressed at low
level ( "hedgehopping" ) for the first attack run then tran-
sited into the circle formation. In many cases the ingress
of attackers was so low the fighter-bombers would perform a
"zoom" climb to 600-800 meters to gain altitude for their
daring attacks. [ Ref . 62: p. 70] Ground attack forces
became much more aggressive than at the outset of the war.
An example of their aggressiveness is their free hunt
missions.
"Freehunt" in ground attack sorties involved pairs
of fighter bombers searching for targets of opportunity
using the landscape for surprise and escape [Ref. 35: p.
149] . Clearly during these missions pilots used their own
initiative to make tactical decisions on ingress routes,
where to attack, how to attack, and egress routes. In May
of 1943, Stalin created an entire air army of attack regi-
ments specializing in free hunt. They were given no
specific target instructions, but went searching for enemy
communication sites, railroad traffic, etc. [Ref. 58: p.
56]
Tactical variety for ground attack operations
became common. Aircraft attacking the same target would
come in from different directions, at different altitudes
and using different formations. "In carrying out their
missions the Soviet ground attack pilots demonstrated flexi-
bility in their choice of tactics." [Ref. 48: p. 220] In
addition, other examples of initiative and creativity used
in 1942-43 include: improvisations such as setting fire to
the grass with incendiary bombs in the Don area to force the
German troops to retreat; using phosphorous incendiary
bullets in the Kuban bridgehead to hamper troop movements;
and building an artificial smoke screen 300 feet high to
conceal the approach of ground attack aircraft [ Ref. 48: p.
223] .
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The following episode attests to the "daring, initi-
ative and tactical skill of the ground attack pilots. " A
group of fighter bombers arrived at an area where they had
been told by reconnaissance a group of tanks was located.
The pilots found a meadow dotted with haycocks. The lead
aircraft ordered the haycocks be strafed though no tanks
could be seen. Within the hay were tanks. Separating into
pairs, the pilots bombed and strafed the tanks. As they
finished destroying the tanks, they were attacked by a group
of Messerschmitts. The ground attack pilots turned and
engaged the fighters and then returned home. [ Ref . 73: p.
41] Earlier in the war when pilots did not see their target
as they were told they would, they would return to base, and
if attacked by fighters, they turned and fled. Now, they
showed initiative in deciding to attack the hay stacks and
the discipline to stay and fight the German fighters.
In contrast to the developing initiative, when
ground attack operations did not succeed, poor results were
blamed on loss of surprise and in some cases because "the
interaction between the assault planes and their covering
fighters had not been sufficiently worked out in practice .
"
[Ref. 72: p. 58] Bad results, then, were attributed to not
enough detailed planning and practice by some air force
leaders.
The bomber tactics made only moderate changes during
this period, lagging behind the other air force units. A
revolving attack designed by Col I.S. Polbin had bombers
alternately attack a target as the other bombers circled
around for a reattack. The tactic, similar to the ground
attack "circle, " kept the heads of any air defenses down as
bombers continuously dropped their ordnance. Fighter escort
also had to adjust their tactics to provide cover. Pairs
would split between protecting the attacking bombers and the
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recovering bombers. [ Ref . 62: p. 69] [ Ref . 35: p. 151] As
bomber pilots no longer relied on a lead aircraft to tell
them when to release ordnance, rather than being mechanical
robots, the pilots had to think on their own and make their
own attack runs.
The most significant development of initiative was
the use of bombers in a type of free hunt. "Bombers were
often sent out in total ignorance of the situation on the
ground and attacked any likely target of opportunity at the
decision of the squadron or zveno commander." [Ref. 35: p.
50]
The size of bomber operations were regimental
strengths: three squadrons of 10 following each other at
short intervals. However, the regiments were combined into
massive operations involving 400-500 bombers such as the air
operation against Kharkov, called the largest air battle of
the war. [Ref. 57: p. 295]
Air operations developed fully during this period.
In 1942 when the Germans attacked across the Don, large
Soviet air operations reverted back to rigid tactics. A
formation of 160 aircraft was massacred by air defenses as
they held their pre-determined positions. [Ref. 35: p. 157]
At Stalingrad over 1300 aircraft were coordinated and at
Kursk over 4200 aircraft were used in air operations. The
Stavka made all the final decisions and "displayed impres-
sive skills at organizing large scale air operations.
"
[Ref. 58: p. 32] Single formations of over 500 aircraft at
times were massed in the air and flown against their objec-
tives. The magnitude of such operations required extensive
preplanning for altitudes, checkpoints, target allocations,
times over targets, egress routes and altitudes, recovery
location and times. Entire air armies coordinated their
efforts. For example, at Kursk the 16th, 4th, and 5th Air
Armies and the 6th Long Range Bomber Corps coordinated their
actions. [ Ref. 67: p. 71]
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Air operations were normally three to four days long
and each day had three to four massed raids each involving
350-400 aircraft. Their purpose was to make concentrated
strikes against enemy position to improve the effectiveness
of air power [ Ref . 72: p. 68], Detailed instructions for
procedures during the operation were issued to the Air Army
commander by the commander of the Red Army Air Forces
[ Ref. 74: p. 38] . For an example of the planning, see
Appendix B. It is interesting to note that the Soviets
realized there was a time for planning and a time for spon-
taneous operations. During the Battle of Kursk, an order
from the Deputy Commander of the Red Air Forces, Col Gen of
Aviation Vorozheykin, read:
As a consequence of the loss of surprise of attack . ,
the results of our massed raids (air operations) . .
have declined sharply . . . my orders are: to make
breaks of 3 or 4 days in the massed raids ( air opera-
tions) . . . going over during these days to broad
operations against motor and rail shipments using
"hunter" forces. [Ref. 74: p. 39]
As discussed earlier, free hunt missions were spontaneous
attacks at the discretion of the pilots. So, despite the
growth in the air operation and correlating growth in
preplanning, Air Force commanders still saw the need for
surprise and initiative and freedom of operations required
to achieve that surprise.
In summary, "by 1943 the entire balance of air power
in the Soviet-German conflict had shifted in favor of the
Soviet Union." [Ref. 75: p. 62] The Germans felt the
Russians had learned a lot from their defeats in 1941 and
were becoming an increasingly more difficult adversary
because of their sophisticated tactics and deception
[Ref. 66: p. 63]. "The Soviet airman thus developed into an
opponent who could no longer be disclaimed . . . this was
quite apart from the steadily increasing number of
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aircraft." [ Ref . 48: p. 62] The developments in initiative
and tactics from the Summer 1942 through 1943 are summarized
in Figure 3. 3 .
TACTICS INITIATIVE
1. Fighters - Wider formations( +
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Tactics and Initiative Summer 1942-1943
4. 1944 Through 1945
In the final period of the war, 1944-1945, the Red
Air Force experienced a continued growth in initiative in
fighter forces to probably its high point of this century.
During this phase initiative reached a plateau and even
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declined as an average across the entire Air Force. This
was due to the massive air operations which took place and
due to the large increase in the number of new pilots coming
into the combat units. Pilot training shortened to rapidly
fill air armies. This swift training could not keep the
standards of realistic training set in 1943. According to
the retreating Germans some of the new soviet pilots
displayed reluctance in engaging them. 11 The growth in the
air operations led to an increase in preplanning and
detailed organization. Therefore in the Soviet air command
the potential existed for conflict between pilots and
commanders who believed in and emphasized initiative and
flexibility and those who thought minute preplanning was
critical to successful operations. On the whole, by Spring
of 1944 during which the Soviets began their offensive in
the center of the Eastern front, "Soviet air squadrons were
showing the same resilience and flexibility in support of
combined land-sea forces as Anglo-American air arms were to
show in Western Europe a few months later. [ Ref . 75: p. 70]
The prowess of Soviet air power was demonstrated
fully in the Crimean Battle. In 1941-1942 the Germans had
overwhelming superiority in aircraft and men in the attack
on Sebastopol; yet they could not take the city for 250
days. In April of 1944 the Soviets captured Sebastopol in
four days - air power playing a significant role in
assisting the offensive. [Ref. 53: p. 832] [Ref. 48: p.
272]
lx To the end of the war the Germans believed their
pilots were better skilled intellectually, emotionally, and
spiritually. However, at the same time so too did the
Soviets believe their pilots were superior in all ways to
the 'fascists claiming in the final battles to have shot
down 6-7 fold more German aircraft in air battles than they
lost. (See Schwabedissen, p. 267, Wagner, p. 388, and
Prussakov, p. 264)
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By 1944 Soviet fighter pilots were highly qualified
and a serious opponent. This development had been expected
and feared by German commanders. Soviet pilots were being
trained to act independently and aggressively in an ever
increasing manner as though they were "masters of the
heavens. " Their tactics were increasingly "clever;
"
exploiting weather conditions and attacking from multiple
directions at varying altitudes. Pairs were linked loosely
and some fighters roved alone. Free hunt became the
preferred mission and the fighters became increasingly
deadly. "Dive bombers which became separated from their
formation were invariably shot down by Soviet fighters. "
[ Ref . 48: pp. 301-314]
One of the most famous Soviet fighter pilots of the
war sums up well the creative initiative that existed in the
fighter mentality during this period because of leadership
and training from men like himself. Thrice hero of the
Soviet Union, Marshal of Aviation A.I. Pokryshkin had this
to say:
Each air combat has its own unique features. In a war,
what was good yesterday is not always suitable today.
In air combat it is dangerous to always use the same
routine procedures. The value of creativity for a
fighter pilot is that at the essential moment he is able
to use not one of the 100 previously learned procedures
which would be good in a certain situation, but rather a
new 101st, which arises unexpectedly for the enemy in an
acute moment of the engagement. The style for
conducting combat by each Soviet pilot without fail must
be marked by creativity. [ Ref. 61: p. 48]
Ground attack pilots distinguished themselves in
obliterating enemy tanks, trucks, and aircraft by using
innovative tactics. In attacking airfields, attacking
aircraft circled at 5000 feet outside the AAA range and dove
sequentially in pairs, single ship, or as entire flights for
the attack. Following weapons delivery, the aircraft would
climb back up to the circle outside the AAA range for a
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reattack. The Soviet pilots frequently used deception in
their tactics by feigning an attack to draw up German
fighters and when the fighters left the major Soviet assault
would arrive. [ Ref . 48: pp. 326, 338] Another clever tactic
was the use of obsolete biplanes to harass troops at night.
These aircraft had no application for day fighting, but
under the cover of darkness were effectively used to lower
German morale. The Soviets showed flexibility in using
former transport planes effectively rather than have them
sit idle. (The Germans adopted this same tactic in 1944.
)
[Ref. 75: p. 69]
In ground attack aviation permanent elements and
groups were formed in squadrons and regiments; however indi-
vidual pilots navigated to the target on their own, rather
than relying on a lead aircraft to guide them [Ref. 72: p.
171] . The airmen improved in using terrain to cover their
approach to the target and in achieving surprise. Units
were assigned targets before takeoff, or they were given a
target enroute by radio from the area command post.
[Ref. 48: pp. 328, 339] These missions required flexibility
from each individual pilot, shifting targets in mid-air,
planning an ingress route while flying in order to use
terrain for cover, and deciding on delivery tactics when the
target was sighted. 12 In addition, "rational initiative" was
encouraged. A commander of an attack group could redirect
his group to a new non-stationary target sighted enroute
which he judged more important than his assigned target,
immediately informing his commander. An attack on a
stationary target could not change unless the target was not
occupied or because of bad weather. ( It is possible making
12 In many cases flights or groups of aircraft operating
under the control of a lorward observation post would be
given guidance to the target, told which target to attack,
and when to return to their airbase. In the future, this
control would be over emphasized to the point of reducing
greatly pilots' initiative. (See Prussakov, pp. 47, 118)
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a decision in flight was dangerous if the mission was unsuc-
cessful because of potential disciplinary actions.
)
[Ref. 76: p. 186]
Bombers continued to make regimental attacks and
improved their flying techniques. They, too, employed
deceptive decoy tactics. In one case a high flying recon-
naissance aircraft followed by a small bomber group would
fly into a target area to draw a reaction from German
fighters. A heavy bomber force approaching from a different
direction would wait until the most favorable moment to
attack; for example, when the Germans were recovering at
their airfield. [Ref. 48: pp. 359-360] Bombers lagged
behind the fighters and ground attack pilots in initiative
because the vast majority of their missions were part of the
massive air operations.
Air operations in 1944 grew to involve 5683 fighters
and fighter bombers and 1000 ADD bombers during the
Belorussian offensive. In 1945 air operations against
Berlin involved 7500 aircraft. [Ref. 77: pp. 270, 346]
[ Ref. 58: p. 64] During the Belorussian campaign the extreme
preplanning for the entire front was supervised by Marshals
Zhukov and Vasilevskiy. Front commanders completed their
own detailed planning and supervised it to the last detail.
Aviation Marshals Novikov and Golovanov supervised the
ground attack and bomber planning and execution. [ Ref. 67:
pp. 212, 213]
Organizing thousands of aircraft in the air required
precise navigational control. Ground control methods
included radio beacons, lights, radio stations, homing
stations, orientation markers, letters, and numbers.
Approaches to targets were controlled by colored markers,
smoke pots, and flares. [Ref. 77: p. 272] The control
methods aided the planning by giving precise locations over
v/hich aircraft were required to be at a given time and
altitude.
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All the aspects of the air operations ( take off
time, altitude, speed, time on target, return altitude and
location, etc. ) were planned for 153,000 sorties during the
Belorussian air operations and 92,000 sorties in Berlin air
operations. [ Ref . 77: pp. 283, 361] Also included in the
planning was the integration of fighter cover with bombers
and ground attack aircraft; deciding which requirements or
divisions would support one another. Needless to say, in
order for so many details to be successful discipline and
obedience to orders and timing was required quite the
contrary to independent creative flying. For precise
control of aircraft during operations, commanders of air
units were placed in army command posts and used radio
commands to make any corrections for coordinating with the
ground forces. [Ref. 72: p. 226]
The results of WWII show the Soviets were successful
in using air operations as a means to concentrate the fire
power of their air force. The success reinforced the value
of detailed planning in the minds of the commanders who
experienced this combat. Creative planning and decisions
for battles was removed from the pilots and lower level
commands in air operations plans. This period plays a
significant role in the struggle between initiative and
planning in influencing Soviet Air Force doctrine in the
future.
This period, then, is characterized by innovation
and continued independence in fighters and ground attack
aircraft; some creativity in bomber tactics, although this,
too, was preplanned before takeoff countering any inflight
initiative; and a great increase in the amount of planning
required by air operations. Initiative and tactics for
1944-1945 is summarized in Figure 3. 4 .
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TACTICS INITIATIVE
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During the four years of fighting, the Soviet Air
Force changed from being over centralized and constricted
with stereotyped, inflexible tactics to a force having
fighters full of initiative and at the same higher level
commanders sold on detailed planning. The fighters and
ground attack pilots grew to prefer "lone wolf" free hunt
missions, exemplifying their independence and individual
initiative. The tactics became increasingly fluid and
dynamic, changing and adapting as the battle or dogfight
required. And, pilots and low level commanders sought
creative solutions to their tactical requirements. At the
same time, air operations grew from formations of 40
aircraft to ones involving over 500 planes. Integration of
fighter, ground attack and bomber regiments, divisions, and
entire air armies required extensive planning under central-
ized control. Two approaches ( schools of thought) to
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fighting the air war developed - that of initiative and
independence in fighters and that of preplanning air opera-
tions. The differences in attitudes, methodologies, and
doctrines between these two schools of thought may, to a
degree, be analogous to comparing USAF's Tactical Air
Command's fighter pilot mentality and Strategic Air
Command's planning mentality typified by the detailed Single
Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). However the analogy
falls short because of the differences between the US and
Soviet systems. Soviet planners of the air operation had
control over the fighter assests as well as bombers.
Because of this, there is a good chance the two schools of
thought had disagreements on how to fight the war, particu-
larly in the area of command and control. Planners, of
course, favored tight lines of command and control while
fighters operating on their own initiative favored looser
command and control.
The parallel development of the use of initiative
and preplanning for detailed air operations moved along a
course shifting from tight command and control towards a
looser command and control and moving back towards the orig-
inal tight command and control although not in the same
position as in the beginning. Along the way, lower level
commanders ( from regimental commanders to flight lead)
developed independence in their decision making in the plan-
ning of tactics and formations and in the execution on the
battle field and in dogfights. The tightening in command
and control occured as the air operations grew in size and
complexity. However, this did not stop continued growth in
initiative and creativity among fighters. The two developed
simultaneously. This movement towards more initiative and
preplanning is illustrated in Figure 3. 5 .
It is difficult to assess whether or not the
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Figure 3. 5 Development of Initiative with Preplanning.
the overly centralized command and control that existed in
June 1941. There are drawbacks and vulnerabilities in over-
centralized command and control as was clearly demonstrated
in the destruction of the Soviet Air Force. At the same
time, there are advantages to tight C2 as demonstrated by
the success of the air operations. However, all too often,
western analysts emphasize the vulnerabilities of rigid C2
at the expense of omitting the developed initiative.
Assessments of Soviet airmen, then, tend to highlight their
need for centralized control and suggest that Soviet pilots
therefore lack individual characteristics such as initiative
which is highly valued in the west. This is not the case at
all. Looking beyond C2 and at the tactics shows initiative
was very much a part of Soviet fighter operations. The
Soviet pilot may have been culturally different and fought
on different fronts under different commanders, yet the
initiative developed was very similar to the initiative that
developed in western fighting during the war. To illustrate
this point and further balance the perspective on Soviet
initiative, western planning and initiative during WWII is
briefly discussed.
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C. BALANCE: WESTERN AIR DOCTRINE
It is important to remember when criticizing Soviet over
centralization that during WWII all air forces used a
centralized committee system for running the air war and
even democracies tended to have dictatorial policies which
impacted greatly on strategy and tactics. For example, it
was Winston Churchill who insisted on a strategic bombing
campaign despite resistance he received from military
advisors. [ Ref . 65: pp. 127, 129]
US air doctrine in 1944 stated "the inherent flexibility
of air power is its greatest asset. " The flexibility
discussed is the ability to concentrate air power. To do
this required centralized control in a superior commander
over the ground and air forces. [Ref. 78: p. 2] Control of
available air power in the theater must be centralized and
command must be exercised through the air force commander.
[Ref. 78: p. 7]
Western fighter tactics varied in their development. In
the US, air doctrine was concentrating on strategic bombing
and individual fighter pilots of the 1930' s developed air
tactics "on their own initiative." [Ref. 79: p. 81]
Original tactics like the Russians' were built around a
three ship fighting unit. [Ref. 80: p. 21].
What became characteristic of the US fighter pilot is
that during the heat of battle he would improvise and make
things work; "we are such incredible innovators that we
overcame our errors almost without recognizing them.
"
[Ref. 79: pp. 36, 88] Also, the initiative of the wingman
was considered critical by US pilots in WWII. A US Mustang
pilot, John C. Meyers, testifying to the US War Department
stated:
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Mainly its my wingman' s eyes I want. One man cannot see
enough. When attacked I want first for him to warn me
then for him to think. Every situation is different and
the wingman must have initiative and ability to size up
the situation properly and act accordingly. There, is no
rule of thumb for a wingman. [ Ref . 81: p. 109]
On the other hand, the British fighter at the beginning
of hostilities had a "rigid, attack-by-the-numbers scheme"
which some commanders were reluctant to abandon. Pilots
were taught to make a highly stylized approach; so
controlled, it was "totally unusable in an air battle of any
kind." [Ref. 82: p. 27] The Royal Air Force broke away from
their rigid beginnings and adopted individualized tactics
combined with fighter direction from radar control.
Furthermore, the Germans for all their tactical innova-
tions were also victims of over controlling. Their tactics
became restrictive in that all pilots had to fly standard
rear, front or quartering attacks depending upon the direc-
tive of the Inspector General for Air Defense at the Reich,
Adolf Galland [Ref. 80: p. 130]. The Soviets also mentioned
the rigidness of German flyers saying "the enemy stuck to
the same pattern in his tactics. " [Ref. 83: p. 71]
Western bomber tactics also show similarity to Russian
bombers. The US 8th and 12th Air Forces Wing Tactical
doctrine was characterized by "flexible rigidity. " Tactics
were adopted and no deviation from them was tolerated in
order to provide maximum mutual defense and unit cohesion.
Tactics were modified with experience. [Ref. 80: p. 115]
Bomber operations were slow in developing, it took the
British "more than two years to discover how to drop these
bombs on a target area as large as a big city. It took even
longer to find out how to hit a precise target. " [Ref. 84:
p. 126]
The point of briefly covering western doctrine and
fighter and bomber developments is to show some similarities
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and differences between Soviet and Western initiative in air
combat. Fighter operations bred independence and initiative
in the West and Soviet Union. Bomber operations by their
nature had to be more coordinated and preplanned to be
successful. Therefore, both East and West developed initia-
tive and preplanning during the war. It is important to
realize this when criticizing the Soviets' highly central-
ized command and control so as not to forget the West did
likewise. This is not to suggest that the systems in the
East are identical to Western planning and flying. Each
developed in its own context of cultures, individuals, and
battles. Soviet fighter pilot initiative of WWII was not
necessarily a better or worse quality but of a different
kind.
D. WWII CONCLUSION
The primary point is that Soviet fighters did develop
and exercise initiative during WWII. Initiative made them
better fighters than at the beginning of the war. They
became a formidable adversary as individuals. Has this
initiative of WWII stayed with the Soviet fighters? To
trace the movement of initiative from the war, the next
section follows the battle for control and power between the
"planning school" and the "initiative school" from the late
1950' s to the present.
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IV. INITIATIVE AMD POST WAR YEARS
A. SURVEY
During WWII, the Soviet Air Force developed initiative
and encouraged independent actions especially among its
fighter pilots performing "free hunt" missions. Following
the war, proponents of initiative probably contended for
influence and power against proponents of preplanning and
extreme centralized control. In the previous chapter bomber
tactics were presented to show their lack of initiative and
the development of the "preplanning " school of thought.
The focus of this thesis now narrows to primarily initiative
in fighter tactics. To determine the fate of initiative in
the Soviet Air Force during the post war years to the
present, the official journal of the Soviet Air Force was
studied for changes in tactics and doctrine. A content
analysis was done to measure the relative emphasis given to
initiative through the years.
Translations of the official journal of the Soviet Air
Force were available from 1957 to the present. From 1957 to
1961 the journal was titled: Herald of the Air Fleet . From
1962 to present, the magazine has been titled Aviation and
Cosmonautics . Each monthly issue for every year from
1957-1984 was surveyed. 13 Tactics and training articles and
editorials were reviewed for doctrinal changes, new tactics,




There were no issues available for 1969 and 1970. The
translations for the 1950 ' s through 1968 were performed by
Air Technical Intelligence Translation, Air Technical
Intelligence Center, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio. Issues
from 19/1 on were translations by the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service. In the early 1970 's only selected
issues were translated and therefore some issues are missing
in the data sample. The data gaps were compensated for
through weighted averaging to give the closest probable
results similar to those years with all 12 issues.
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To measure the amount of emphasis on initiative quanti-
tatively, the number of occurences of words relating to
individual initiative, such as initiative, creative, innova-
tion, were counted for each article. Words were counted
only if they contextually related to the concept of indi-
vidual initiative of pilots or unit commanders. Thus, words
or phrases such as "collective initiative of the party" did
not count. The tabulation of the number of occurances or
"hits" per issue measured the intensity of emphasis towards
initiative. The total intensity plotted for each year shows
the rising and declining trends of initiative over time.
Tables of the data collected are in Appendix III.
To balance the straight quantitative measure of initia-
tive, the themes and developments in tactics concerning
initiative are presented for each year. This validated the
statistical presentation in that the contextual emphasis for
or against initiative matched the quantifiable indicator.
Although the exact number representing a given year is not
meaningful in and of itself, combined with the overall
context of tactical developments in the Soviet Air Force,
they do represent the relative emphasis on initiative from
1957 to 1984 and can be used in predicting the current state
of affairs in Soviet fighter tactics.
B. RESULTS
First, an overview of the major trends through the late
1950' s to the 1980 's is presented. This is followed by a
more detailed description using quotations from the years
studied.
1. Overview
On the average, initiative declined in emphasis from
the late 1950 's until the early 1970' s. The decline in
emphasis may have a direct relationship to a decline in
influence of initiative in Soviet air doctrine. Through the
1970 's the emphasis on initiative has risen to approximately
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2/3 the relative value of the high point in the 1950' s.
Figure 4. 1 shows the annual results from 1957-1984 plotted
using a linear fit. The five year averaging line shows the
decline lasting from 1965 to 1975 and the following rise.
However, the yearly plots indicate a drop in 1964 that was
not regained until 1981. Also significant is that the rise
from 1971-1973 and the rise from 1978-1982 were both
followed by sharp drops. As will be shown in detail, the
rise and falls in emphasis on initiative on the graph coin-
cide with changes in the Soviet Air Force.
In general, the changes in emphasis relate to
changes in doctrine stemming from the developments in tech-
nology, particularly nuclear weapons. These doctrinal
developments have been divided into stages by Soviet
writers. Lt Gen Kozhedub said in 1968 that the tactical
stages were:
1) World War II to 1953
2) 1954 to 1959
3) 1960 to present (1968) [ Ref . 85: pp. 2-7]
During the post war, Stalin era, a future war was
seen as being essentially the same as WWII [Ref. 86: p.
27. ] . 1954-1959 was a transitional phase during which
nuclear weapons were developed as well as improvements in
jet technology. As nuclear weapons became more prolific,
conventional doctrine and tactics from World War II began to
be challenged by faster speeds and increased destructive
power of the nuclear weapons. In 1954 the B-52 strategic
bomber entered service in the US Air Force [ Ref. 87: p. 240]
.
Shortly, thereafter, in 1955 the MiG-19 Farmer entered
service. The farmer was nearly 200 mph faster than the MiG
17 and had nearly double the MiG 17 's rate of climb.
[Ref. 88: p. 220-223] Also, the MiG-21 Fishbed which was
designed specifically to counter the B-52 threat took its
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first flight in 1955 [ Ref . 89: p. 477]. The MiG-21 came
into service in 1958 and was capable of speeds greater than
mach 2 [Ref. 88: p. 227] [Ref. 90: p. 99] . Through the late
50' s the US continued to increase the speed of its fighters
and bombers and improve on missile technology. In 1956 the
F-104 and the B-66 entered service along with a new infrared
heat seeking missile, the AIM-9B Sidewinder [Ref. 90: p.
74]. The Sidewinder homed-in on infrared (heat) emissions
from an opponent's aircraft. The missile traveled at Mach
2.5 and had a range of about 2 miles [Ref. 91: pp. 136-37].
Missile and jet technology in the 50' s changed
aerial fighting. In this second tactical stage it was
believed that war would inevitably escalate from conven-
tional to nuclear war and "will be demonstrated by a short,
intense, massive exchange of nuclear weapons delivered by
rockets and planes." [Ref. 86: p. 29] The large formations
used in World War II were no longer necessary as one
aircraft with a nuclear bomb could destroy entire army
formations. The large close-in dogfights of WWI and WWII
were being replaced by high speed jets trying to shoot down
an opponent, who may be carrying a nuclear weapon, from
miles away. Also, faster speeds made target acquisition and
reattacks after a missed intercept more difficult. Radar
and ground control of fighters became an integral part of
fighter employment. [Ref. 85: p. 2]
In the third stage, beginning in 1960, the initial
stage of nuclear war was considered decisive [Ref. 86: p.
30] . Readiness to prevent surprise nuclear attack was crit-
ical. Radar surveillance and positive control on protective
fighters became a critical concern of the Soviet Air Force.
Along with the nuclear doctrine came the development of
air-to-air missiles and the ability to engage enemy aircraft
well beyond the close-in gun fights of previous wars.
Eventually, missiles could be launched at aircraft beyond
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visual range (BVR). The "eyes" enabling missiles to "see"
the targets were new radars. Early technology because of
size and weight restrictions gave ground controllers a much
better view of the air battle. Therefore, controllers grew
in importance for directing fighters to their unseen
targets. [ Ref . 85: p. 3.]
In 1960 an improved ground control radar, the
Barlock came into service [Ref. 92: p. 439]. In 1961, the
Fishbed was given an improved air intercept radar R1L Spin
Scan for use with the Russian version of the AIM- 9-- the AA-2
Atoll. The Atoll was made in two versions, infrared like
the AIM-9B and one which was radar guided. Radar guided
missiles homed in on radar returns from a target aircraft.
The AIM-7 Sparrow, a longer range US radar missile, also
came into service in 1961. Radar missiles such as the
Sparrow and various models developed in the 60 ' s that
improved upon the original radar missiles were designed
primarily for long distance engagements against targets that
were many times not seen visually during the initial
maneuver to set-up the intercept. Pilots were armed with
weapons that were no longer guided by their own vision and
their aircraft radars gave them only a crude glimpse of the
target. Therefore, the pilots required assistance from
ground radar operators who had a clearer picture of the
fight. It is also interesting to note that the missiles
developed in the 60 ' s were not effective at close ranges--
less than half-a-mile. The missile technology was not
geared to dogfights or tactics of the last war but instead
were made for long range intercepts. The epitome of Soviet
technological development for this mission during the 60 '
s
was the long range, mach 2 + MiG-25 Foxbat which appeared in
April, 1965 [Ref. 93: p. 386]
.
As a result of these developments, traditionalist
war fighting was replaced by a "new vision of nuclear
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warfare . . . World War II took a back seat to the revolu-
tion in military affairs." [ Ref . 86: p. 30] Emphasis on
initiative which was high following the war began to lose
ground. Pilots had to obediently follow the directions of
the Ground Control Intercept (GCI) commander rather than use
their own intuition, creativity and initiative to defeat an
enemy fighter.
Along with the fighters, initiative in ground attack
aviation was being lost. For example, auto pilots were
developed which could fly an entire attack profile except
for the take off, weapons aiming, and landing. [Ref. 94: p.
36]
The saving grace for any initiative to survive
included the conventional role that the Soviet Air Force
could still fight; incomplete radar coverage; single
aircraft delivering nuclear weapons; and, most important,
the WWII fighter pilots remaining in the Air Force command.
Soviet doctrine in the 1960's held that in local conflicts
the Air Force would fulfill its mission of aviation support
to the troops. This entailed fighter cover and conventional
interdiction and close air support missions. [Ref. 95: pp.
1-3] Some of these missions were preplanned in detail as
were large air operations of WWII; however, they also left
open an area which veteran fighters could argue in favor of
initiative. WWII had proven planning could not predict
every possible event in war and that pilots needed initia-
tive to make decisions during battle. Veterans justified
realistic training, freedom of action and the need to culti-
vate initiative in order to fulfill these missions.
In addition, incomplete radar coverage across the
European theater justified the need to instill initiative in
the new fighter pilots who would fly free hunt missions in
the coverage gaps. Pilots would have to acquire targets,
choose their intercept tactics and engage them without the
aid of GCI. This required individual initiative.
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In a similar vein, the nuclear weapons allowed a
single aircraft to perform the same mission which earlier
required entire formations. The lone fighter-bomber
missions were preplanned, but pilots would need initiative
to make decisions if the preplanning failed. Similarly,
commanders would need initiative to carry on their missions
in the event of communications being disrupted by nuclear
attacks. The surprise of a nuclear attack could leave insu-
lated units paralyzed unless unit commanders had the initia-
tive to carry on their combat.
For the above reasons and their personal experience,
the WWII veterans spoke strongly in favor of initiative. By
their survival, these pilots realized the need for freedom
of action for unit commanders and individual pilots.
Through the early 1960's, the appeals for initiative
were gradually drowned out by the extreme concern for safety
and the improvement in technology. Nearly every issue of
Aviation and Cosmonautics included articles which stressed
discipline, adherence to regulations and safe operations.
The over emphasis on safety constrained exercises and
training. Commanders held innovation back for fear of
getting bad write-ups for safety violations or accidents.
Articles on initiative diminished and all but disappeared.
In addition, technology in the 1960's through the
1970' s allowed increased command and control on a broad
scale and over individual pilots. Radar coverage and GCI
sites increased. Also, automatic flight control systems
were improved to further potentially reduce the pilot's
role. And, an automatic flight recording system ( SARRP
)
allowed commanders to check on a pilot's compliance with
prescribed mission profiles. Pilots were actually criti-
cized for performing one more additional aileron roll than
the mission called for! The combination of technology and
bureaucratic over concern for safety reduced initiative in
the Soviet Air Force.
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The rise in initiative in the 1970' s and 1980 ' s was
preceded with a change in doctrine. In the late 1960's,
military writers began discussing the beginning conventional
phase of the next war. [ Ref . 86: p. 31] In 1969, Maj Gen
Zemskov wrote, "In time a conventional war can be of long
duration." [Ref. 96] Nuclear war was no longer inevitable.
Russian historical experience called for the "continuing
need for a large conventional force." [Ref. 86: p. 33] The
opening conventional operation became an increasing possi-
bility for destroying NATO's nuclear capability before it
was used against the Soviets. The air operation expanded as
part of an overall combined arms Blitzkrieg type strategy
against NATO's central region.
To accomplish this conventional mission, scientific
methodology and preplanning had to be combined with indi-
vidual initiative. Once again, veteran fighter pilots
argued that initiative was necessary to be successful and
survive in combat. These arguments had to mesh with the
"scientific" methodology which had become intrenched in the
Air Force bureaucracy in the mid-1960' s. Thus, a synthesis
with science, methodology and initiative was developed.
Just as in the late 1950' s and early 1960's, commanders were
once again criticized for being overly cautious and too
safety minded. Training was called upon to be more real-
istic to allow freedom of action for pilots and the develop-
ment of initiative.
Technology began to shift with the doctrine in the
late 1960's. The results were improved performance in
aircraft, radars, and missiles which improved individual
pilots' capabilities and their capabilities to operate with
the GCI operators. The Jay Bird radar in 1970 gave Fishbed
pilots a better picture of the fight. In 1971 the MiG-23
entered service and in 1973 it was given the High Lark AI
radar [Ref. 97: p. 127]. This radar allowed pilots improved
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ability to autonomously search for targets. In 1977 the
AA-7 Apex SAR/IR missile was added to the inventory to
compliment the improved radar. In 1978 the AA-8 Aphid AAM
appeared [ Ref . 98: p. 166]. The AA-8 was specifically
designed for close-in dogfights. As pilots' s radar vision
improved and they had both long-range and close range
missiles, technology was moving away from single pass inter-
cepts guided primarily by the ground controllers, to
dogfights controlled by the pilots in the air.
The USAF led the way in these developments with the
deployment of the highly maneuverable F-15 in 1974 [Ref. 90:
p. 82]. The F-15's radar gave the pilot the ability to
track multiple targets simultaneously and choose which ones
to engage. It gave the pilot a new pair of eyes with long
range; and, as in the world wars, many times the pilot with
the best eyes who could spot the enemy first would get the
kill. The new radar took the eyes from ground control vans
and put them in the cockpit. In 1978 the F-16 entered
service. This aircraft is clearly a return to dogfight
tactics because it was designed to be the most maneuverable
aircraft in the world and was not given a long range radar
capability of the F-15 because the radar's weight would have
reduced maneuverability. Pilots would rely on their own
eyes, cues from the new US AWACS, and heat seeking missiles.
Responding to the US lead in technology and in
agreement with their own shift in doctrine, the Soviets
developed highly maneuverable aircraft, the MiG-29 Fulcrum
which appeared in 1979 and the SU-27 Flanker appearing in
1982 [Ref. 99: pp. 97-112]. These new aircraft were being
put into service at a time when, overall, initiative appears
to be rising. Improved technology gave pilots improved
autonomous operations capabilities. However, Soviet devel-
opments which follow US technology cannot be assumed to be
used in exactly the same way the US uses its technology.
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Along with new fighter technology the Soviets have also
developed improved methods of control, such as the Mainstay
Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) aircraft. This
aircraft's inservice date of 1984 [ Ref . 99: p. 103] coin-
cides with the downward drop in initiative in 1983-84. This
may be pure coincidence and the Soviets may use the Mainstay
simply as an improved radar warning system. On the other
hand, the Mainstay may be a vehicle for placing controllers
closer to the pilots with improved radars. Controllers
onboard the Mainstay could be linked directly with
commanders of flights of Su-27 type aircraft. Or, if the
Su-27's radar is similar to the F-15's in being able to
track multiple targets while scanning [Ref. 100: p. 75] then
Su-27 flight commanders could themselves act as mini-
controllers guiding their flight's every move and removing
the necessity for flight elements to make decisions on their
own. This is to date, however, only speculation.
Since 1982, there has been a re-emphasis on the
nuclear character of a future war [ Ref. 86: p. 34] .
Doctrinal rhetoric indicates a concern for the development
of defenses against conventional arms and stresses the
inevitable use of nuclear weapons to achieve victory at the
theater level [Ref. 101]. This return to Kruschevian rhet-
oric may be a signal of a return to a decline in emphasis on
initiative. This could partially explain the downward drop
in the content analysis for 1983-1984. (See Figure 4.1)
In the years following WWII, it is impossible to say
if technology has driven doctrine or doctrine has driven
technology. There does exist a very close relationship
between the two; each influencing the other. In turn, as
doctrine is affected by technology (or vice versa), so too
are tactics affected which must stay in step with doctrine
and technology. WWII tactics had to be modified and changed
to work with jets and missiles. Improved radars, missiles,
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and aircraft impacted on the tactics of the 60 ' s and 70' s.
Finally, interwoven among the tactics is initiative. In the
60' s with crude radar, the new high speeds of jets made
tactics with initiative unworkable. Improvements in tech-
nology have given the pilots the tools necessary for initia-
tive, but at the same time technology has also given the
Soviets the necessary tools for controlling fighters from
the ground and in the air. Figure 4. 2 shows technological
developments overlaid on the trend of initiative.
In general, tactics have followed the progressive
loss and regaining of emphasis on initiative shown in the
content analysis. As will be shown in the yearly descrip-
tions, they moved from relatively fluid two ship formations
following WWII to single ship interceptions mechanically
flying under GCI control to once again two ships with some
freedom for the developing wingmen and finally multiship
flights similar to WWII employments. (See Figure 4.3) The
time periods for the tactical changes are flexible and are
marked on the graph to demonstrate trends more than absolute
dates. (Current tactics and the Afghanistan influence will
be discussed in the following chapter.
)
2. Yearly Descriptions
The following comments and quotations express the
emphasis and tone in the rhetoric on initiative in a given
year's articles in Aviation and Cosmonautics . Over the
years the emphasis noticeably shifts as the quantitative
analysis on initiative demonstrated.
a. 1957
Emphasis was on individual freedom of action due
to increased speed and wider formations.
"In conjunction with this, the role of indi-
vidual initiative and independent actions of a pilot becomes
more important." [ Ref . 102: p. 16]
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"It is best to conduct sham battles over the
airfield so that fight personnel can observe the ground
dynamics of the entire combat. For fighters this combat
must be free and creative." [ Ref . 103: p. 14]
Complaints were made of "excessive caution"
which led to crews being told everything that was to happen
"down to the finest details. " This trains pilots to
"operate in a routinized manner and passively, without the
necessary combat stress . . . the harm of such an approach
to training is obvious." [Ref. 104: p. 4]
b. 1958
Unlike the modeling in the 1970 's and 1980' s,
for tactical air briefings, "the officer in charge of the
exercise did not outline in advance any of the possible
decision variants, feeling that this would commit him to a
decision and would fetter the initiative of the flying
personnel." [Ref. 105: p. 34]
"And moreover, the situation can change suddenly
even when the crew is aloft. The flying personnel and
commanders aloft will have to react somehow to this change
and make independent decisions. " Preplanning exercises does
not teach this. [Ref. 106: p. 26]
During combat, the pair must be able to split
for close cooperation and mutual support. The wingman must
have initiative to carry out counterof fensive maneuvers
against attackers (See 4.4). [Ref. 107: p. 17]
If the attackers follow lead, the wingmen
performed a combat turn to reposition for a shot on the
attackers. The author emphasized the independence of each
pilot and their mutual support in a number of scenarios of
counter offensive maneuvers. Later, in 1964, these types of
maneuvers were named and executed on the lead's command. In
1958, the wingman' s actions were encouraged to be on his own
accord while executing the named maneuvers.
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Figure 4. 3 Trends of Tactics and Initiative.
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Figure 4. 4 Wingman Initiative/Mutual Support.
c. 1959
"Present-day aerial combat has become so brief
that the pilots cannot wait instructions from the commander
as was the case before. " The wingman must be free.
[Ref. 108: p. 77]
"Independent decisions require initiative . . .
excessive prompting from GCI fetters initiative.
"
[Ref. 109: pp. 22-24]
"In combat practice to carry out the mission
pilots had to take responsibility upon themselves in the
course of a flight and change the original decision. "--Maj
Gen of the Air Force, A.I. Kurochkin [Ref. 110: p. 29]
There seemed to be a major push for initiative
by generals of the Air Force including Lt Gen S. F. Ushakov,
Hero of the Soviet Union. They were concerned with
passivity and fear of risk-taking causing a loss in fighting
capability and this included a loss in decisiveness and use
of initiative by their pilots.
d. 1960
"Extreme preplanning for routine training.
Basic aerobatic maneuvers were planned and diagramed for
training missions." [Ref. Ill: pp. 37-41]
".
. . aviation equipment has become so devel-
oped that a pilot cannot any longer rely on his senses
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alone. " High speed intercepts without good airborne radars
forced pilots to rely on GCI assistance to find targets.
The pilot is not completly passive, but acts with initiative
in the engagement phase. [ Ref . 112: p. 8]
Despite these negative impacts on initiative,
Marshal of the Soviet Air Force and Hero of the Soviet
Union, S. I. Rudenko (Commander of the 16th Air Army during
WWII) wrote:
In exercises some instructors sometimes describe before
in detail how the flight personnel must act in the air
and make them memorize selected diagrams in the course
of training. There is no need to prove that this leads
to routinism and fetters the initiative of pilots and
commanders . After such training, when tEe situation
changes in the air, the pilots either simply do not
react to it or find themselves in a complicated situ-
ation . . . commanders of small units must be allowed
the necessary independence so that they can learn to
make tactically sound decisions quickly in accordance
with the situation. [Ref. 113: p. 112J
e. 1961
A shift from initiative to command post control;
its impact is felt today.
The controllers did not argue about initiative being a
good thing, but claimed that success during vectoring is
decided by strict compliance with commands. If there is
no compliance, the most precise calculations made even
by a computer may go to pot. [Ref. 114: p. 30]
A wingman takes initiative in the attack after asking
permission to do so. [Ref. 115: pp. 86-87]
In most intercept situations initiative is being
taken from the pilots as they follow the commands of the
controllers. However, in a low altitude attack, when pilots
are faced with a new situation, they are told to act first
to destroy a target and then tell the command post about it.
[Ref. 116: p. 43]
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f. 1962
Success depends on scientific calculations.
"Superior results will come only when the pilot learns to
carry out a maneuver while maintaining the assigned parame-
ters. " [ Ref . 117: p. 63] Pilots are told to "maintain
prescribed G-loads, speed, and altitude. " Tables are drawn
up to scientifically show the proper flying techniques.
"Each combat employment flight must be precisely planned now
and this requires a high level of theoretical training.
"
[Ref. 118: p. 38]
Independent nuclear operations still require
initiative as individual pilots "will have to act and make a
decision in accordance with an aerial situation
independently." [Ref. 119: p. 5]
g. 1963
A reversal and direct challenge to some of the
concepts presented in 1962, 1963 shows a high emphasis on
initiative regardless of the risk involved.
pilots must be given more independence in carrying out
tactical training flights ... it is necessary to give
them the opportunity to estimate for themselves the
flight - the profile, speed, approach direction, types
of maneuvers, attack methods, ere. [Ref. 120: p. 39]
During tactical exercises, . . . "instructors
teach the pilots to make independent decisions and put them
into practice." [Ref. 121: p. 61]
It may happen that the initiative displayed will not
produce the desired result in combat at once. After
all, anything can happen in war. But, even then, the
officer who has acted with initiative does not deserve
reproach, since he strove to carry out the assigned task
with everything in his power. We can and must reproach
the one who hesitates to make a decision, fears respon-
sibility, does not act, and does not use at the right
moment all the capabilities and means for winning a
victory. [Ref. 121: p. 63]
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h. 1964
Primary mention of initiative dealt with inde-
pendent nuclear operations and free hunt operations to
destroy the enemies' nuclear weapons. [ Ref . 122: pp. 2-4]
Otherwise initiative declined as pilots were encouraged to
"act strictly in accord to the specific situation. "
[Ref. 123: p. 16] Elaborate equations are drawn out to
determine times over targets. [ Ref. 124: pp. 74-80]
i. 1965
Initiative is still considered necessary for
combat [Ref. 125: p. 28] and a young pilot asks in a letter,
"why are we afraid of initiative or a risk if it has to be
taken? Is risk only possible in war? Why is the initiative
of young men often fettered?" [Ref. 126: p. 32]
However, this was greatly overshadowed by arti-
cles on automating the control of aviation; the use of
preprogrammed autopilots, and scientific quantification for
commander's decisions [Ref. 127: p. 45].
Automation "amounts to having the entire flight, i. e.
,
climb, the movement along the trajectory, the letdown,
the prelaunching maneuver, and the landing carried out
by automatic devices. " The role of the crew amounted to
tasking and operating the computer. Although much of
what the writings referred to was theoretical, the
emohasis was away from individual control towards auto-
mation and preplanning. [Ref. 94: p. 36]
j. 1966
Most discussion on initiative is now seen in
negative comments by authors aware of the problems in
training saying we've got to stop "fettering initiative."
The loss of initiative is to the point that overprotected
student pilots are no longer reacting to emergency situ-
ations but have to be told what to do. [ Ref. 128: p. 65]
Criticism is still made of over-simplification of exercises,
pilots memorizing tactics and operations so that the
"write-up" of the exercise looks good; despite the fact that
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regulations "do not impose restrictions on their (pilots)
initiative but on the contrary provide much room for this.
"
[Ref. 129: p. 97]
k. 1967
Mention of the wingmen spotting a target first
and attacking while calling his intentions to lead. The
spread formation allows for initiative and freedom of
action. [Ref. 130: p. 118] Overall, little mention of
initiative in the writings.
1. 1968
There is no longer any place at all for intuitive
?redictions in the development of air force tactics,
he time has come for a profound scientific approach to
these problems . . . now calculations, graphs and
nomograms are the basis for answering any questions in
tactics for drawing conclusions, and for establishing
recommendations. [Ref. 131: p. 34]
Criticism of exercises lacking realism held
solutions to be in improved methodologies and detailed
plans, not more freedom of action as was proposed in similar
articles of the 1950' s [Ref. 132: pp. 28-34]. In addition,
BVR missile engagements are described as requiring GCI
assistance; automatic control is improved; and the SARPP
(Automatic recording system for flight parameters) is touted
as a great tool for ensuring flight safety and maintaining
control. The SARPP monitors altitude, speed, RPM, hori-
zontal axis level, angle of deflection of the stabilizer,
and 9 other flight characteristics. A proper reading of the





Primary emphasis was directed at developing
increased objective control and consistent pilot responses.
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The solution proposed was the development of a "uniform
methodology for training flight crews. " [ Ref . 134: pp.
32-33]
Training should differ little from actual
combat; a WWII veteran recalls that victory belongs to the
fighter with initiative and "this type of flight will
require him to think a great deal while resolving a complex
set of tasks. " However, "strict sequential instruction
methods should be employed . . . . " to achieve these
results. [Ref. 135: pp. 44-47]
o. 1972
The new generation of pilots "at times some of
them express the opinion that such concepts as initiative
and activity in battle have become outmoded and that now
neither the pilot nor the crew can allow the slightest devi-
ation from the previously prepared flight plan or the
instructions of the command post . . . often a pilot must
decide for himself the method of destroying an assigned
objective . . . then the success will depend to a decisive
degree on his initiative." [Ref. 136: p. 8] The 'scien-
tific' training system has permeated down to the common
pilot; however, veterans still realized initiative will be
required in battle,
p. 1973
Both extremes against and for initiative were
strong in 1973. Against initiative were articles slandering
daredeviling.
It has happened that individual aviators have permitted
themselves to willfully change the conditions, proce-
dures and sequences of exercises . . . under the auspi-
cious pretext of "an experiment", "initiative" or "a




a resolution was passed which obligated communists who
were instructing young people not to allow fooling
around during combat employment flights ... to
strictly carry out the laws of air service and obey the
demands of sale flights. [ Ref . 138: p. 12]
These comments indicate that pilots were in fact exercising
their own initiative outside the control of command and this
was deemed a serious problem.
On the other hand, those in favor of more initi-
ative were writing: "too detailed a plan stifles initiative
in battle." [Ref. 139: p. 41] Also, "combat experience
teaches that success would be achieved by those commanders
whose decisions and actions contained no rigid stereotype,
whose subordinates displayed initiative, innovativeness, and
boldness." [Ref. 140: p. 18]
q. 1974
"Rigid observance of requirements and appro-
priate methodological principles" was the main emphasis.
Although, once again WWII examples were used to illustrate
initiative, such as "the wingman frequently became the
leader, and the leader, in turn, covered the attacker,
supporting him or adding to the weight of the attack on the
enemy. " [ Ref. 141: p. 3]
Also, an article against daredevil stunts
recounted the events of a Lieutenant disconnecting his SARPP
recorder in order to "hedgehop;" that is, fly at a lower
than authorized altitude. The pilot was dealt with severely
and was made an example to discourage these types of activi-
ties. [Ref. 142: p. 8] Thus, one of the best examples of
free spirit was squelched. Also, the fact that this problem
was written about indicates it was probably not a one time
occurance; but, was considered a grave enough problem for
the Air Force leadership to dissuade any other pilots
considering such 'free flying'.
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r. 1975-76
The main theme for this period was somewhat of a
balance between control and initiative. "Improve flight
control . . . tight control does not fetter initiative.
"
[ Ref . 143: p. 11] ". . . train flight personnel in a
creative, scientifically sound manner." [Ref. 144: p. 44]
s. 1977
Modeling is considered good to a point, but in
free air combat, one cannot depend on a memorized sequence.
A synthesis developes between using a simulation method or
model that is scientifically based and "innovativeness, that
is, the ability to find a correct solution in non-typical
situations." [Ref. 145: pp. 2-3]
t. 1978
During this year there was little mention of
initiative outside of a few comments about teaching cadets
to independently analyze their flights and make independent
decisions while flying [Ref. 146: p. 171].
u. 1979
"In a fluid engagement where the situation
changes abruptly every second . . . and this is confirmed by
the experience of the Great Patriotic War . . . only the
fighting man with initiative can be victorious. " This is
developed in training by a "situation approximating combat
to the maximum possible extent. " Articles stated that the
way to do this is through creative modeling and during the
flight making necessary changes through initiative.
[Ref. 147: pp. 4-13] Once again, initiative is spoken of in
a more positive manner, only now it is blended with the
scientific solutions.
However, on the negative side, a pilot who
showed aggressiveness and initiative during a dogfight which
he won is given a two week probation for overstressing the
aircraft beyond the "scientific" limits of a proper
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maneuver. Thus, the ingrained control mechanisms remain and
may prevent a great development of initiative. [ Ref . 148:
pp. 36-40] No matter how good the initiative may have been,
once it goes beyond the approved boundaries it is completly
wrong.
v. 1980
Training exercises during which the entire
squadron pretends to be an element commander or squadron
commander are conducted. Participants try to solve tactical
problems. "Crews acted intelligently and displayed initia-
tive and independence when solving complicated tasks. "
[Ref. 149: p. 17]
Over formalization and stereotypical training
and modeling is criticized during exercises. "In a real
combat situation the commander's lack of initiative could
have cost many lives. " [ Ref. 150: p. 66] "The development
of a commander's ability to think independently and to make
decisions is a subject of constant concern for senior
commanders. " Commanders are told to force their subordi-
nates to decide on their own to increase their confidence.
[Ref. 151: p. 27]
w. 1981
'Everyone should be creative in tactics. ' If
leaders help new pilots in finding original procedures,
they'll develop a "taste for independence" and this is actu-
ally encouraged! [Ref. 152: pp. 11, 12] "Each airman is
granted the right to independently seek for and implement
the best solution for the assigned mission." (Under a
commander's authority). [Ref. 153: p. 29]
x. 1982
Almost full circle in return to the position on
initiative 20+ years earlier; over concern for safety is
criticized and initiative among wingmen is encouraged.
Commanders "who, in the race for high indicators in
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fulfilling the flight training plan, try to simplify the
aerial situation when working on tactical problems. They
often fly the same patterns over and over again, and their
tactics are never distinguished by novelty either.
"
[Ref. 154: pp. 3-4]
"Basic attention should be given to mastering
tactical cooperation so that each pilot in a two-plane
element could successfully perform the functions of both the
wingman and the leader and, when necessary, to operate indi-
vidually . . . ." [Ref. 155: p. 28] "Every pilot is both a
shield and a sword. " This means an enemy will be attacked
by the pilot for whom it is easiest to use his weapon while
his partner backs up the attack, and, if necessary, applies
pressure. [ Ref. 156: p. 18]
Initiative is once again proclaimed critical for
success.
y. 1983
Proclamations for initiative are held tightly in
check by proponents of modeling and those concerned with
safety. Stereotyped training is said to stifle initiative.
[Ref. 157] However, others say "improvisation is a thing of
the past. Innovation cannot disappear from our profession.
"
The innovation they spoke of was that in models and new
scientific solutions. [Ref. 158: p. 13]
Again, "daredevils" such as a student pilot
whose SARPP read out showed he had flown two - too many
rolls during a training mission are reprimanded and grounded
out of an over concern for safety and a fetish for flight
discipline [Ref. 159: pp. 54, 55]. The result is that
"attention of the regimental flight instructors was directed
toward increasing control over the methodological training
of the group leaders. " [Ref. 160: p. 11] It is almost as if
the leadership fears the initiative and freedom in flight
will spread like wildfire to other units ( and perhaps even
beyond a military context into society at large).
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z. 1984
Discussion on initiative in data available was
very low. Articles on roving free hunt, which in previous
years mentioned initiative, make no mention of individual
initiative. Description of the wingman was not of an inde-
pendent fighter as was the case two years earlier.
[Ref. 161: pp. 45-49]
3. Summary
Initiative was a part of the Soviet Air Force
throughout the period studied; however, it clearly rose and
fell in influence with changes in doctrine and technology.
Even though pleas were made in the late 1950 's and early
1960's by some of the leading generals of the Air Force, the
momentum of preplanning and technology slowly extinguished
individual initiative to a large degree from the new fighter
pilots being trained. Safety violations and deviations from
the planned training scenario were the only avenues for
expressing creativity and initiative while flying. These
were exposed through the monitoring systems and dealt with
severely--to the extreme that an extra aileron roll in
training led to the pilot's being grounded for a week. The
same lobbyists for initiative in the 1960's appealed again
in the mid 1970' s, WWII veterans who knew the true value of
initiative. The emphasis on initiative has risen sharply in
the late 1970' s and early 1980' s; although in 1983 and 1984
it has taken an apparent drop. This reemphasis points to
the fact that the lack of initiative is a real problem in
the Soviet Air Force. For over two decades now, their
training has become "routinized" and unrealistic. The
protagonists of initiative are trying to change that.
However, as will be covered in more detail next, the prog-
nosis is not good. A campaign for initiative nearly twice
as strong in the journal twenty years ago did not stop its
decline even though the war memories were only 15 years old.
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Now, the bureaucratic momentum of scientific modeling and
further improvements in electronic command and control could
be an even greater opponent to initiative. (This could, in
part, explain the drop in emphasis during 1983 and 1984).
The bureaucratic leadership may be attempting to hold to a
minimum any gains in initiative for fear of possible polit-
ical consequences. This could possibly explain the sharp
drop following the rise in emphasis which peaked in 1973 and
1982. The ideas of the Soviet collective left unchallenged
by combat experience may stamp out the anomaly of individual
initiative given a long enough period of peace.
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V. CURRENT TACTICS AND TRAINING
Current Soviet air tactics and training for conventional
roles of the air force are not new; but, rather a repack-
aging of old tactics and doctrine of WWII and the late
1950' s. Since approximately 1979 with the resurgence of
emphasis on initiative, tactics have changed from simple one
pass intercepts to more maneuvering combat. 14 Currently, the
Soviets are combining 'scientific' methodology to justify
and prove the concepts of bygone tactics. It is believed to
be an attempt to regain the initiative that existed but was
lost. As shown in the previous chapter, discussions today
by leading Soviets about the freedom of the wingman and
increased arsenals of tactics to choose from are a return
back to the tactical thoughts that emerged from WWII. They
are not breaking new ground as is thought by some Western
intelligence analysts 1 5 but are retrenching old ground with
computers on their backs. One Soviet General spoke of this
necessity of bringing back tactical concepts of the past,
including the initiative that accompanied them, saying:
Is it possible that I am fighting for the past? Has the
development of new equipment and weapons made frontline
soldier's mastery of combat, tactical findings, and
creative approaches obsolete, stripping them of their
instructiveness and educational value?
14 Some analysts feel this shift is a result of the
Soviets observations of the US experience in Vietnam and the
Middle East wars. Rather than long range missile engage-
ments, air combat in these conflicts frequently resulted in
maneuvering dogfights. See O'Brien, Frank J. Every Man A
Tiger, also Pennington's articles in Air Force Magazine ,
March 1984 and March 1985.
15 See Pennigton, Rana J. Capt, USAF "Closing the Tactics
Gap, Air Force Magazine Mar 84, p. 83 and "Another Look at
the Soviet Pilot, Air Force Magazine Mar 85, p. 83.
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He went on to say training was completly unrealistic
because, "the pilots imitating the target fly only in a
straight line without changing altitude and speed. "
[Ref. 162]
The Soviets do not openly and thoroughly describe their
current training programs and tactics. However, a remark-
able similarity between descriptions from the 1980 ' s and
those of the 1950 's and early 60' s was noted. For example,
the recent complaints by Soviet Air Force leadership about
unrealistic training, oversimplification, and the need for
pilots to make independent decisions and take risks while in
the air is a mirror image of the same complaints being made
20 years earlier. Because of this and many other similari-
ties, some of the more detailed descriptions of tactics
written in the 50' s and 60 ' s were used along with the pieces
of current tactical descriptions to extrapolate and estimate
current training and tactics and their allowance for initia-
tive. The question is whether or not their complaints are
having any impact.
A. AIR-TO-AIR TACTICS
It is evident the Soviets today are talking about
returning to previous tactics which allowed pilots to act
and make decisions on their own while airborne. This can be
seen by developments in areas such as, the wingman's initia-
tive, air-to-air combat maneuvers, and GCI control versus
independent search.
1. Winoman' s Initiative
In the 1980' s, attention has once again been drawn
to making wingmen proficient:
basic attention should be given to mastering tactical
cooperation so that each pilot in a two-plane element
could successfully perform the functions of both the
wingman and the leader and when necessary also operate
individually, using all available information.
[Ref. 163: p. 28]
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Also, General Lieutenant of Aviation S. V. Golubev, Chief of
the Soviet Air Force Combat Training, said of pairs:
"pilots in a pair must always be ready to switch their
roles-that is, the strike must be made by the pilot in the
more advantageous position." [ Ref . 164: p. 85] These same
types of arguments in favor of wingman's initiative were
made in the early 60' s. Then, in class room training, both
element lead pilots and wingmen were given tactical problems
and challenged to make their own solution to the problems.
[Ref. 165: p. 24] As the theoretical support for initiative
is similar in the 60' s and 80' s, so too is the current
training syllabus to instill initiative in pilot skill for
leads and wingmen probably similar to one 20 years ago.
2. Air-to-Air Combat Maneuvers
Current training is designed for maneuvering
combat. 15 The training begins with theoretical training,
followed by single ship aerobatic work, then single-ship air
combat maneuvers. The pilot is then trained to work in
pairs and fourship formations and is finally tested during
tactical flight operations. Current training emphasizes
the inclusion of initiative in the final process of
training:
Usually, when preparing for air combat, a pilot first
rehearses a number of standard offensive and defensive
maneuvers, which subsequently give him a foundation in
highly-maneuverable air battles. This is a logical
stage in our development. But the practice of executing
one and the same maneuvers, engagement after engagement,
during repeated rehearsal and drill, has hardly proven
effective. As experience indicates, such an approach to
16This is a change from pure interceot training which
had evolved from maneuvering combat of WWII and the late
1950' s. Air-to-air missiles, GCI control, etc led the
Soviets to believe most air engagements would be long range
single pass intercepts. In addition, the Soviets' new
aircraft, the SU-27 Flanker and Mig-29 Fulcrum may once
again provide maneuvering capabilities that match that of US
aircraft or exceed US capabilities as was the case of the
Mig s superior turning capability over the F-86 Sabre during
the Korean war. See Spick
<
Mike, Fighter Pilot Tacti cs, The
Techniques of Daylight Air Combat




training thwarts a pilot ' s initiative and leads to
predictable routine . A pilot must get away from this.
The experience of. the men who fought in the Great
Patriotic War convincingly attests to its fatal conse -
quences . [ Ref" 166: p~. T9~]
This progressive system of training pilots is not unique but
was discussed openly during the 50' s and 60' s. Instructors
were told to use an individual approach and bring the
students to the next phase in training only when they are
ready. For example, the following is taken from 1957:
When the basic training (piloting) for the young airman
was over, Lysakov (the commander) took all possible
measures to provide simulated aerial combat conditions
for perfecting flying techniques and their combat appli-
cation. As the airmen of the squadron would master the
difficulties of one set of training exercises, the
commanding officer would assign new and more complex
tasks. [Ref. 167: p. 2]
The missions progressed to multiship combat engagements,
just as the 'new' syllabus of the 80 's is designed.
Just as the syllabi are similar, the training maneu-
vers for wingman flexibility and initiative are probably
also similar. There is no indication in the open source
writings of any radical changes. :
7
Previously, training was
accomplished by the element leader calling the name of a
maneuver to be executed. The pair would then fly the
prescribed maneuver such as a combat turn, wingover, loop or
their aerobatic maneuvers. 13 [Ref. 168: pp. 37-41] As the
pilots progress to flying in a pair during simulated combat,
the lead calls the maneuver for the wingman to perform in
17 In fact other analysts have concluded that tactical
writings nearly 15 years old are useful because the tactics
described will not change drastically. See Kieling, p. 66.
This thesis contends tactics of even 25 years ago are
similar because they are founded on the same tactical-
concepts of maneuvering combat.
13 A combat turn is a climbing 180 degree turn used in
air-to-air and ground attack tactics. The Soviets' term
wingover refers to a maneuver similar to a split 'S' - a
half roll and 180 degree descending turn using the vertical.
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reaction to being attacked [ Ref . 169: p. 27]. As the
wingman becomes more proficient they can decide indepen-
dently on their own initiative the correct counter offensive
maneuver to use.
In most of these maneuvers, the attackers are
predictable and attack as a pair only one target. This
means most of their training is unrealistic in terms of
Western tactics which call for attackers operating indepen-
dent of each other once the fight is on. [ Ref. 170] The
Soviet attackers seem almost passive as though the entire
scenario is prearranged. There are no indications either in
current literature or that of the 50 's and 60 's of training
engagements evolving into free flowing multi-turn dogfights
typical of US fighter training. This aspect of current
training, though it is an attempt to develop initiative,
falls short of the Soviets' WWII experience with air combat.
Following are examples of the counter-offensive
maneuvers believed to be a part of the current training
program to develop initiative. These are taken from a 1958
program [Ref. 171: p. 17] ; however, as stated above, the
current reemphasis on developing wingmen initiative and
statements from Air Force leaders supports the assertion
that current training programs closely resemble previous
programs designed to instill initiative.
In the first case, Figure 5.1, the attackers stay on
lead as he performs a hard horizontal turn. The wingman
executes a combat turn to position himself for a shot on the
attackers. This maneuver was described in Squadron leader
Harbison' s report on the tactics use by Migs in Korea. The
defensive split instantly "poses a problem for the attacking
pair of which one to follow." [Ref. 81: p. 126]
The tactic allows the defensive pair to use their initiative
and turn the tables on the attacker. Also, it can draw the
adversary to disadvantageous altitudes by use of the
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Figure 5.1 Wingman's Shot.
vertical. This is exactly what Soviet Air Force tacticians
Babich and Dubovitskiy were driving at in a 1977 Aviation
and Cosmonautics article:
The adversary should be drawn to a disadvantageous alti-
tude by a combat formation in which one group engages,
while the covering group continuously attacks the adver-
sary vertically. It would be a gross error to change to
horizontal maneuvering immediatly following the first:
pass. The initial altitude advantage should be main-
tained during the entire engagement and be expended very
economically. In the war in Korea, the enemy s combat
formation would be split by a dagger thrust by the lead
group, while the attack group would attack the enemy
aircraft, which were deprived of support. [ Ref . 81: pp.
126, 127]
The reference to the tactics of the Korean war by leading
tacticians of the late 70' s further support the similarities
of current training programs to earlier ones which were
geared for maneuvering combat.
In a second case, if the lead pulls a horizontal
turn and the attackers follow the wingman begining a combat
turn, the wingman decides to perform an oblique loop to
bring the attackers around for a shot by lead. (Figure 5.2)
A third variation has the attackers splitting, although both
aircraft are attempting to get a shot on the lead aircraft.
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Figure 5.2 Lead's Shot.
The counter offensive response has the lead and wingman do
combat turns in opposite directions. The wingman foils the
shot of the right attacker, rejoins the lead and both disen-
gage by a sharp descending maneuver. (Figure 5.3)
Figure 5. 3 Dual Combat Turns.
This is certainly not an exhaustive listing of the
counter-offensive maneuvers, but gives the general tone and
flavor of the training program. It is estimated that the
current training program would approximate this very
105
closely. The rhetoric about independent wingmen with their
own initiative requires a program such as this to begin to
move in that direction. Also, the Soviets habitually use
past programs from WWII, modified, to suit their current
needs; articles are full of combat engagements used to
illustrate a point.
Air-to-air combat training is moving toward redevel-
oping initiative, but falls short of US concepts of initia-
tive and free maneuvering. Soviet training does not appear
to allow for maneuvering beyond the first counter-offensive
move once attacked. The assumption appears to be that the
counter-offensive maneuver will always work; perhaps because
it is a 'scientific' solution. US training is known for
maneuver-counter maneuver with each pilot continuing to try
and 'get a shot' on his opponent [ Ref . 170]. Also, in
Soviet training the attackers ( or target aircraft in
training) rarely split--another example of the wingman being
welded to the lead--to attack both aircraft in the pair.
Nor do the attackers make any attempt to counter the
counter-offensive maneuver. Again, the outcome seems to be
already decided by the first maneuver. Hindering the move-
ment of the wingman cuts the potential for creative tactical
thinking and initiative in half and thus, reduces the combat
potential.
There is no evidence that the Soviets have chosen a
radically new approach to training their wingmen in initia-
tive. There are, however, signs that a squadron of
specially trained 'adversaries' may have been formed to
inject realism into combat training. Pilots of this
squadron would supposedly act as top instructors by
performing combat maneuvers near perfection. [ Ref. 164: p.
93] Pilots fighting against these 'aggressors' of sorts may
get dissimilar air-to-air combat training( DAACT) , that is a
Flogger fighting against a Fishbed. If the training
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squadron flies Floggers and a Fishbed unit flys against them
for training, or, if the special training squadron receives
the new Mig 29 Fulcrum or Su-27 Flanker before other units,
then DAACT is very possible. This would expose pilots to a
wider variety of adversaries instead of constantly flying
against members of the same regiment. However, it would
probably not alter significantly the training for initia-
tive. The basic 'tried and true' of the past will most
likely continue.
3. GCI Control vs Independent Search
If the Soviets return to training for initiative and
independent actions, technology and GCI control have to be
integrated with the initiative of missions such as indepen-
dent search or freehunt. In current writings, free hunt
type missions similar to those of WWII and the 50' s and 60 '
s
are receiving emphasis under the title independent search.
In most air-to-air missions, pilots are vectored to their
target by the GCI. 19 As discussed in the previous chapter,
through the 60 ' s and 70 's GCI control had a direct negative
impact on pilots' initiative. Many pilots flew mechanically
as they obediently followed the GCI commands without much
tactical thought. 20 However, during a free hunt or indepen-
dent search mission, a pilot is given a geographic region to
search and destroy targets without the help of GCI control-
lers. He must make his own tactical decisions on his own
initiative.
New aircraft such as the Flanker which may soon be
operational are reported to have improved doppler radars
similar in capability to the US F-15's. This radar could
n For an example of this in current training see Zhilin,
A. Cant, "Why the Intercept Failed, n AK No. 3 1984. (FBIS 20
June 84) pp. 15-16.
20 The assertions here are taken from the criticism by
those who supoorted initiative against the rigid training
system that developed with increased GCI control found while
researching the content analysis.
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allow improved independent search capabilities over the Mig
23 's High Lark radar. For example, it is estimated that the
Flanker's radar can track while scanning [ Ref . 172: p. 75].
Thus, pilots would have a much bigger picture of the air
situation. They could decide on their own which targets are
the most threatening and engage them while searching for new
targets. There would be far less need for a GCI controller
to lead the pilot to a fight. The new technology could
allow the greatest initiative yet. Flight leads could
become small battle managers by allocating their wingmen to
the incoming threats picked-up by their radar. Leads would
have to be trained in decision making and wingmen would be
forced to fly autonomously once given their target
assignment.
However, at the same time new fighters were being
developed, the Soviets have been developing an improved
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) [Ref. 173]. The
Mainstay AWACS is larger that the current Moss AWACs. The
increased size of the aircraft allows for more computer
processing power and may give the Mainstay the necessary
capabilities to be used in Central Europe against NATO. The
introduction of an airborne control platform could increase
their radar coverage and alleviate the need for independent
search missions. Independent search missions have tradi-
tionally been in places where there are gaps in radar
coverage; but, any ground radar gaps could be filled by the
AWACs. Thus, the outlook for independent search missions
could be similar to that of the Free Hunt missions 24 years
ago. Just as the speed of jets, ground radar, and GCI
stifled the independence of intercept pilots, new technology
with the airborne radar may slow the development of indepen-
dent search missions and, given enough time, may eliminate
them. As shown by the content analysis in the previous
chapter, emphasis on initiative declined sharply in 1983 and
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84. This could be an indication of a shift in tactical
thought because of the operational deployment of the
Mainstay and a drop in training in independent search.
Although this is speculation, it would be interesting to
track the deployment of the new AWACs and match it to a
continuation of the content analysis to see if there is a
correlation.
B. GROUND ATTACK TACTICS
One final area in current tactics before discussing the
influence of Afghanistan on initiative is the emphasis
placed in preplanning of ground attack missions. Since the
mid 1960's, Soviet doctrine accepted the possibility of a
conventional phase at the outset of a war in Europe
[ Ref . 174] . Since then the doctrine moved further toward
the importance of a decisive conventional victory which
would negate NATO's theater nuclear capability before it
could be used. The Air Force's role in accomplishing this
mission is through the execution of the independent air
operation. This air operation would include over a thousand
aircraft penetrating through small corridors punched in
NATO's air defenses. 21 [Ref. 174: pp. 44,46] In order for
these aircraft to reach their targets, return home, and
deconflict the mass of other aircraft in the air, the opera-
tion requires extreme preplanning of launch times, ingress
and egress routes, safe altitudes to fly through their own
air defense, attack tactics, times over targets, etc.
Daily training to prepare for this operation most likely
entails preplanning and control measures to ensure compli-
ance with the plan. This in turn would hinder the develop-
ment of initiative among the ground attack pilots involved.
21 For a detailed discussion on the air operation, see
Petersen, Phillip A. and Major John R. Clark, "Soviet Air
and Antiair Operations," Air University Review March-April
1985, pp. 36-54. and Petersen Soviet Air Power and the
Pursuit of New Military Potions , Studies in Communist
Affairs .^?ash~DC. GPQ . 1T7T.
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Although there may be an increased emphasis on planning
in ground attack, the tactics do not appear to have changed
dramatically over the last two decades. Maneuvers used in
WWII and refined during the 1950' s and 1960's appear to be
the standard today. 22 All maneuvers are 'scientifically'
computed in terms of G-loading, timing, angle of attack,
etc. The most common maneuver is the combat turn. When
abeam the target the attackers fly beyond it for 10-12
seconds. They then pitch up in a climbing 3-4 G turn,
acquire the target and release ordnance. [ Ref . 175] (See
Figure 5. 4)
Figure 5. 4 Ground Attack Combat Turn.
A similar maneuver is the half-loop in which the target
is passed and the turning back for the attack is done more
in the vertical than in the horizontal plane of the combat
turn. [Ref. 176] (See Figure 5.5)
22Current articles on ground attack tactics do not
describe in full detail the tactics used as did issues in
the 1960's. However, the bits and pieces of tactics
presented, when put together, closely resemble previous
tactics.
110
Figure 5. 5 Half Loop Attack.
Selection of the maneuver can be preplanned, or the decision
can be made while attacking should weather change or terrain
be a factor that was unknown prior to the mission. Some of
the preplanning involved includes routes and maneuvers for
reattacks of a target. These are drawn out in elaborate
detail to include angle of bank, timing, and other safety
factors. [ Ref . 177: p. 14] In training the Soviets
currently link success with good exhaustive preplanning,
"... success was planned and orderly, well thought through
preparation . . . ." [Ref. 178: p. 13] To ensure the proper
execution of the plan and safety, ground attack missions are
controlled by range safety officers during routine training
at bombing ranges and by forward air controllers( FAC) during
exercises. At a bombing range, pilots must ask permission
for each bombing run made. [Ref. 179: p. 31] During
tactical exercises aircraft remain in contact with FACs to
receive course corrections and targeting information
[Ref. 178: p. 12] . With the Soviets' extreme concern for
safety it would be plausible for the FACs to act as a
controlling authority for safety and deconfliction in a
similar fashion to range controllers. Pilots may have to
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receive clearance as well as targeting information from the
FACs to make an attack run even during exercises.
The use of initiative during planned exercise missions
appears to minimal. Wingmen wait for the leader's commands
before taking action: "Maneuver! barked Captain Pereva's
voice over the radio, his first command since the flight had
taken off. He and his wingmen swept toward the target.
"
[ Ref . 178: p. 12] Even during scenarios which are dynamic,
in that the targets move just prior to takeoff of attacking
aircraft, planning attempts to remove any need for in-flight
initiative. For example, in one exercise described, an
order for an attack comes to the squadron and a plan is
made: "they quickly computed the route and checked
calculations— everyone had it down precisely, with no
discrepancies. " Then as the weather was "constantly
changing" to make matters worse, new targeting information
came in just before the aircraft were ready to launch. But,
"the scenario did not catch them napping . . . they again
preceded to make calculations." [Ref. 180: pp. 8,9] It is
interesting that the authors chose not to describe a target
change while the aircraft were in flight. This would have
required real initiative and individual creativity by those
aloft as was performed during WWII. (See Chapter III, B.4)
The Soviets mention in passing these qualities as necessary;
however, they do not seem to put a significant emphasis on
developing them as is being done with air intercept pilots.
Instead the emphasis is on preplanning most likely because
of the predominance of the Air Operation.
However, one area in which initiative would still be
required for the air operation is the destruction of mobile
nuclear weapons such as the Pershing Missile and Ground
Launched Cruise Missile. Since their exact location could
be difficult to gain through intelligence, a group of pilots
would need to be trained in free hunt tactics to locate and
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destroy these nuclear missiles. Without their destruction,
the success of a conventional kill on NATO's nuclear capa-
bility would be impossible. Therefore, it is highly prob-
able that the Soviets do and will continue to conduct
independent search training for their fighter-bombers. This
could involve a certain amount of individual initiative
(although this is not emphasized in the open press articles)
in the pilots who must decide the best tactics to destroy
the target once it is spotted. On the other hand, all the
tactics, ingress altitude, search area, etc could be
preplanned and dictated to the pilots flying the mission.
If this were the case and initiative were taken out of the
pilot's hands, then it could prove a vulnerability for the
Soviets.
If all the ground attack free hunt missions were
preplanned and allowed no room for a changing situation, the
intelligence, deception and camouflage could hinder Soviet
operations. Intelligence could determine what tactics are
being used and help design counter measures. Western decep-
tion and camouflage could be tailored to the given Soviet
tactics and flight profiles.
To this point, the current situation has been discussed
in the European context. On the whole, technology has been
a deterrent to the development of initiative. Radars,
radios and GCI control in the past and now, the Mainstay
AWAC's may bring control over their newest advances in
fighter technology - which are most capable of independent
operations. In addition, the air operation's increasing
sophistication and size demands detailed preplanning which
has affected the initiative allowed in ground attack
training. What happens when technology and preplanning
cannot be readily applied to a tactical situation? The next
section discusses the necessity of initiative in Afghanistan
operations where European warplans did not readily apply.
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VI. INITIATIVE HI AFGHANISTAN
Soviet pilots flew in Afghanistan 64 years ago when
helping the Afghanis fight a civil war against the British.
[ Ref . 181] Today, just as then, the Soviets are finding the
flying uniquely challenging and requiring initiative for
success; although they are finding ways to overcome this
'problem' with new ways of implementing control.
The invasion into Afghanistan, December 25, 1979, resem-
bled the well planned Czechoslovakian invasion in 1968 with
its surprise airborne landings around the capitol and fast
moving ground forces along strategic routes in order to gain
the initiative [Ref. 182]. The invasion represented the
preplanning mentality necessary for large scale operations
in Europe. The size of the Afghanistan operation is indi-
cated by the number of transports involved, 280, nearly 38
percent of the Soviet's military transport capability
[Ref. 183: p. 32] . Also, the "first two weeks of the inva-
sion were an enviable demonstration of top level C3 and
coordination." [Ref. 183: p. 40.] Command and Control was
directed via satellite from Moscow. However, shortly after
the invasion, the Soviets came to realize the difference
between Afghanistan and Europe. Plans and tactics ' scien-
tifically' designed for Europe did not fit the Afghanistan
environment. The Soviets were challenged in Afghanistan by
Guerrilla warfare, lack of in-place technology and extensive
command and control, and the mountainous terrain.
Rather than the Afghanis succumbing to the onslaught of
the Soviet military as occured in Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets became involved in guer-
rilla warfare. Troops trained for massive European war were
now involved in a limited war. Evidence of the Soviets'
growing awareness of the nature of Afghanistan war was the
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gradual increase in the number of helicopters used in
combat. The Mi-24 HIND and Mi-8 HIP helicopters are well
suited for mobile guerrilla warfare; being flexible in
choosing landing sites; their quick response time; and
ability to insert troops and simultaneously provide fire
support- much like the US helicopters during Vietnam. In
January 1980 there were only 15-20 helicopters in
Afghanistan. This grew to 45-60 by June 1980 for their
Spring Offensive. By July there were 175-200 helicopters
and finally the number peaked in September of 1980 at
250-300 helicopters. [ Ref . 184: p. 1105] The Soviets
shifted their forces relative to the conflict over the
period of nine months. What also required modification was
their command and control procedures; for Afghanistan was a
"situation which required an independent, decentralized
style - of command somewhat alien to the Soviet experience. "
[Ref. 185: p. 9]
Afghanistan challenged Soviet command and control proce-
dures because a wide spread C2 network was not already
in-place, as has been developed in Europe. Following the
invasion, Afghanistan was divided into seven military
districts. Because of "field command delays and the
rigidity of the Soviet communications channels, it appears
that each district commander has been given more than usual
latitude to meet combat needs of his area. " [Ref. 183: p.
40] The lack of land line communications and radio relays
causes delays and forced some autonomous operations. Yet,
there is evidence that the Soviets were reluctant to decen-
tralize too much of the decision making to speed up reaction
times of close air support. For example, to receive an air
strike an infantry officer had to go through the division
command post, then over to the Air Force command post;
rather than making his request direct to the Air Force unit
responsible for that geographic region. These time delays
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have caused confusion in guerrilla warfare and this in turn
has led to the Soviets striking their own troops accidently
with their aircraft. [ Ref . 183: p. 41] The problem of
command and control was compounded by the lack of ground
Forward Air Controllers (FACs). The mountain terrain made
it difficult for ground radio to control aircraft coming in
for a strike when they are on the other side of a ridge.
Also, the mountains made it difficult to place radio naviga-
tion units or beacons to help the aircraft find their way to
and from targets [Ref. 186: pp. 17-19]. Thus, because of
the mountains, the nature of their command and control
set-up and lack of an extensive C2 structure, plus the
nature of guerrilla warfare, the Soviets found themselves in
a situation which required individual initiative.
The Soviets began meeting the challenge of Afghanistan
with a combination of planning, initiative and new tactics.
They discussed ideas about the Afghanistan situation in the
open press in articles on "Mountain Flying" or "Mountain
Training." 23 In one such article, Col Protasov stated that
mountains require more planning and initiative [Ref. 187:
pp. 25,26]. Other articles described mountain flying as
requiring "the ability to think clearly and to precisely
implement decisions." [Ref. 188: p. 62] The articles stated
that beyond the normal radio control of a command post which
pilots are used to flying under, they must be able to think
and act on their own; and, that is the essence of individual
initiative. Afghanistan took the pilot into a combat envi-
ronment full of unknowns for which complete plans cannot be
made.
23According to Maj J. Collins, USA articles with similar
titles relate to ground forces tactics and training in
Afghanistan and there was a dramatic increase in the number
of these articles being published following the invasion.
"Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan; A Preliminary
Assessment, working draft 1982 US Military Academy.
At times, pilots had to choose landing sites, modify
tactics, choose which targets to attack, etc.
independently.
Afghanistan, then caused a change in the thinking
patterns of some of their pilots, at least the ones
receiving the initial combat experience. This is true of
both fixed wing and helicopter pilots and is seen in their
approach to flying and some innovative tactics. For
example, single pairs of aircraft are being used for freedom
and ease of control in the mountain flying. This allows the
wingman to operate somewhat autonomously. [ Ref . 189: p. 13]
Also, the pairs allow wing and lead to support each other:
why do they fly in two s? It is the only way. Flights
in mountains, at a great altitude are far from safe and
radio contact is only by line of sight. Here mutual
help of the crews determines everything ....
^ReT.^T9D1
On occasions, such as trying to destroy a rebel ammunition
location in the mountains, pilots have to think up new
tactics or approaches during the flight in order to be
successful [Ref. 189: p. 15].
Normally, during training in Europe, helicopters and
fighter-bombers performing close air support are controlled
by FACs who give the pilots target identification, location,
attack headings, etc. 24 The Soviets have continued to empha-
size the importance of FACs to keep crews informed even in
mountain flying [Ref. 187: p. 26], However, as mentioned,
the mountains can cause problems with communications between
aircraft and a controller on the ground. To solve this
problem, they have begun using airborne scouts. [Ref. 191]
A HIND or HIP normally flys above and ahead of the attack
helicopters. The situation may look like Figure 6. 1 .
24 See chapter V, part B for a discussion on ground
attack training with FACs.
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Figure 6. 1 Airborne FAC.
If the HIND are begining their attack run from 7-8km at low
altitude and popping up to 300m for a diving attack as being
reported [ Ref . 191: p. 683] then, the scout helicopter must
be at least 5-7km ahead of the attackers to have enough time
for target acquisition and relaying the information to the
attackers. The scout may be calling the pop-up to the
attacking aircraft if they are so low that they cannot see
the target prior to the climb. The use of an airborne FAC
in this way in Europe has not been reported in open sources.
It may be unique to Afghanistan. Having an airborne
controller reduces the amount of initiative required by the
attacking helicopters. Although the group of three helicop-
ters operates autonomously, the controller may be unit
commander or high ranking pilot. If this is the case, it
appears as though the Soviets' innovation may in fact limit
the amount of creativity or initiative learned by the
attacking pilots.
Other innovations in tactics include having a HIND fly
high as a decoy to draw fire for the attackers to use for
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spotting the rebels. Also, Mi-4 HOUND have been spotted
dropping flares above attacking helicopters to decoy any
SA-7 Surface-to-Air missiles launched at the helicopters
[ Ref . 183: p. 36]. However, despite these innovations which
are results of creative ideas, planning is still given top
priority in order to take away as much uncertainty and any
need for creativity during combat. For example,
prior to take off we calculate ahead of time the radii
of the turns, required bank angles, and the points for
going into a bank. This gives the navigator the oppor-
tunity to issue timely commands to the pilot concerning
the approach to the turning point, entry into a bank,
and direction of the turn, which reduces significantly
the psychological tension when flying along a canyon. 25
[Ref 186: p. 18]
Thus, given enough time, the Soviets' preplanning and
control appears to be invading the school grounds of initia-
tive that was Afghanistan. At the outset of anti-guerrilla
operations pilots were in an environment which necessitated
the use of initiative and writers in Soviet press encouraged
this development. As the Soviets have become entrenched in
Afghanistan, they have developed new tactics which have
facilitated control. So, where there was once freedom and
uncertainty, there will now be a controller to tell the
pilots what to do. In addition, to deal with mountainous
terrain, preplanning of even the angle of bank and where to
turn is being performed to take the 'load-off the pilots.
It cannot be said that pilots are not gaining in experi-
ence and some initiative in choosing targets and flying in
the mountains against rebels. New tactics and innovations
are being adapted. However, unlike the WWII experience, it
does not appear as though a vast number of pilots will come
25 This thesis does not imply that some preplanning is
not important and absolutely necessary. However, in this
case as in much of what has been described in this thesis
concerning Soviet planning, it appears excessive and at the
expense ot individual initiative and risk taking.
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from Afghanistan realizing the importance of initiative.
Also, because the Soviets have unchallenged air superiority
in Afghanistan, their tactics do not have to consider
hostile aircraft and helicopters. Therefore, the airborne
FACs and other new approaches may not be applicable to a war
in Europe. It is too strong to say the Soviets have not
shown initiative among their pilots - for certainly many
have and this initiative among some may return to Europe and
increase their fighting capability. However, it may be more
accurate to say that the Soviets' frustrations in the moun-
tains against rebels due to poor communications and C2 in
general may give the Soviet leadership a greater apprecia-
tion for their well developed, centralized, tight C2 system
in European USSR and the Warsaw Pact. This may convince
them to increase their efforts toward more and more inhib-
iting' control and further constrict initiative in the long




Initiative in the Soviet Air Force is nothing new; it
can be traced even to the earliest days of the Red Air
Force. During WWII fighter pilots had to rekindle the
initiative that had been purged out of the Air Force by
Stalin. By the end of the war, there was little difference
between the free flowing fighters in the East and those of
the West in terms of initiative. The Soviets realize the
value and importance of initiative; and the Soviet Air Force
has demonstrated the capability to develop initiative.
However, the Socialist system and a penchant for collec-
tivism has slowly suppressed initiative to the point of near
extinction. Only through the efforts of WWII veterans and
"social deviants" and the environment in Afghanistan has
initiative stayed alive in fighter tactics.
Figure 7. 1 shows the trends of initiative from before
World War II to the 1980' s. The values prior to the content
analysis data (1957) are subjective estimates based upon the
tactics, doctrine and writings of that period. The purge by
Stalin put the Red Air Force under strict command and
control guidelines with little room for initiative. Not
until 1942 did the Soviet fighters begin to loosen up their
tactics and develop pilots with individuality, creativity,
and decisive initiative. By the end of the war, Soviet
fighters out performed or at least matched western fighters
with their tactics and initiative.
In 1948 The Soviet Air Force transitioned into jet
aircraft as the MiG-15 Fagot was deployed to its units. New
speeds began pulling tactics away from WWII type dogfights
and initiative.- Also, postwar bureaucracy led to cautious,
safety minded tactics. Commanders could not afford to loose
costly jets on the grounds of 'realistic' training; the new
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war was economic. The freedom of being able to fly whatever
tactics necessary to survive against the Germans no longer
applied. Although initiative was fairly strong just a
decade following the war, comments in 1957 show a distinc-
tive drop from the level of freedom and initiative at the
end of the war. Jets and peacetime greatly influenced
initiative; but, the Soviet Air Force was still filled with
combat veterans who knew what it was like during the war.
They were the ones who spoke-out and fought for initiative.
The resurgence and increase of emphasis on initiative,
after a postwar decline in emphasis through the 1960's, has
gained ground slowly. Since the 1970' s, Soviet tactics have
gradually been returning to ones which allow for individual
decision making . In 1978, there was a marked increase in
the discussions on initiative. However, current trends in
Soviet tactics suggest that the Soviet Air Force at best is
returning to the freedom of tactics and initiative it
experienced during the 1950 ' s. They are not on the verge of
overcoming years of momentum against initiative. This is
evidenced by their experience in Afghanistan.
At the outset of the Afghanistan conflict, the leader-
ship called for initiative among its pilots when control
over them was not possible. New tactics developed and
initiative was employed. However, other new tactics with
airborne controllers is a step towards placing control back
on top of the pilots and holding their freedom for initia-
tive in check. And, correspondingly, writings changed from
emphasizing initiative to stressing preplanning.
Afghanistan offered the best opportunity since WWII to
develop initiative in their fighters; but, appears to be an
opportunity lost as leadership again tried to removed any
need or occasion for initiative.
The Soviet Air Force is replete with tight control meas-
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Figure 7. 1 SAF Initiative 1934-1984.
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Reprimands are given for the slightest deviations from their
planned training flights; making it extremely risky business
to experiment outside the control of authorities. There is
strong momentum towards preplanning, centralized control,
and scientific solutions stemming from the successes of WWII
air operations. Competing for influence against over
control are those fighter pilots who experienced WWII and
saw the absolute need for initiative in battle. As these
fighter commanders age and dwindle in number, support for
initiative will most likely diminish to the point where a
long enough period of peace could ensure the near complete
loss of initiative. Concern for simply 'making it' in the
system leads to an over emphasis on safety to keep the
training reports looking good for superiors at the expense
of realism in their training and could also help put the
flame* of individual initiative out. This was evident during
the 60 's and 70 's when initiative was at its lowest point
and veterans were complaining that unrealistic training was
making Soviet fighters easy prey for any well-trained adver-
sary. In 5-10 years there may not be anyone left to
complain.
This does not mean the Soviet Air Force is a weak oppo-
nent. The suppression of initiative does not erase the
thousands of aircraft opposite NATO. Nor, has the potential
for initiative among Soviet pilots been removed. There is
an apparent innate human response to develop initiative when
survival is threatened severely. During WWII it took the
Soviets nearly two years for initiative to become wide-
spread. This amount of time was allowed only because Soviet
production capability was not destroyed by the German
Blitzkrieg. In a modern conflict it is impossible to say
whether or not the Soviets would have the luxury of time for
the development of initiative--and this may be a significant
vulnerability. On the other hand, the Soviet pilots today
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are much better educated and informed than the pilots of
mostly peasant background during WWII. This could facili-
tate a more rapid development of initiative if the Soviets
were to suffer heavy losses during a war.
In conclusion, the Soviet fighter pilots today have a
history of initiative and tight control. They are not
complete robots incapable of individual decisions though
their training today is more restrictive than western
training. Soviet fighter ground attack tactics appear to
have remained virtually the same since the 1950' s and 60 ' s.
There appears little room for initiative in daily training,
although there are some meager efforts at teaching initia-
tive to subordinates. Unexpected camouflage, concealment or
deception could have a greater effect than realized if their
pilots do not exercise initiative when attacking targets.
In air engagements, during a one versus one dogfight, if
jamming eliminates any GCI control, then Soviet pilots will
most likely be vulnerable. Their training in named maneu-
vers, unrealistic combat situations, stereotyped range
training which the Soviets themselves criticize will hand-
icap their pilots. This is not to say they are bad pilots;
in fact, they will probably execute their planned and memor-
ized tactics expertly; however, the average Soviet pilot
will most likely have great difficulty in making independent
decisions and using initiative at first.
The freedom of the wingman is an indicator of initiative
in tactics and decision making. Since WWII the West has
held the maneuvering of a wingman as essential to tactical
success. US fighters routinely separate wingmen from the
lead for mutual support and individual engagements. Soviet
pilots, however, have vacillated between a wingman being
welded to his lead and the freedom of action talked about in
the WWII tactics. Current tactics are an attempt to move
back toward a free maneuvering wingman; however, they have a
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good distance yet to go. In training, for now, (at least as
discussed in the open press) the Soviets are not living up
to the full potential of fighter initiative of their past or
of US standards. However, it must be kept in mind that they
have clearly demonstrated the potential for developing
initiative and creative flying. The articles railing
against 'wild pilots' who do not follow safety rules are
indicative of free thinkers existing now among the Soviet
pilots. Others, could soon follow in their path if their





The proposed formula by Kudryashov and Nikitin was:
N = CWKNF
where
N = anticipated number of destroyed enemy aircraft
C = Degree of fighter's superiority over the enemy
W = Probability of hitting the enemy aircraft with
fire of one fighter
KNF = Number fighters operational
Col V. Ya Kudryashov and Lt Col P. A. Nikitin, "The Combat
Capabilities of Fighters and a Method for Determining Them",
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2d"GDS Attack 5 8-10 "h" to 283d Ftr Air 5 4|
Air Div "h"+0. 15
2 301st Bbr Air VI Fighter Air 4 6|
Div, III Corps 4 18 "h n + . 10
to +. 15
Corps
229th Grd Atk 5 8-10 "h"+. 15 286th Fighter 5 4|
Air Div to +. 30 Air Division









229th Grd Atk 4 8-10 "h"+.30 286th Fighter 4 4|
Air Div to +.45 Air Division
**Analogous planning was done for the second,
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third and fourth waves.
Key: a--Number of groups
b--Number of aircraft in groups
Commander 16th Air Army, Lt Gen Avn Rudenko
Chief of Staff of 16th Air Army, Maj Gen Avn Brayko
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1984
Issue No. of Articles Hits
1 5 3
2 ( not available)
3 5 1
4 ( not available)
5 ( not available)
6 4
7 ( not available)
8 ( not available)
9 4 1





18 = adjusted total
When issues were not available, the total was adjusted with
the average weight of the available issues. For example, if
3 of 12 issues were not available, one fourth of the total
was added to calculate the adjusted totals. It is assumed
that the emphasis on initiative is on the average evenly
distributed through the year. This was taken to be the most
equitable manner to compensate for the missing data and
hopefully does not greatly over or under represent the
emphasis on initiative.
The five year averages are a sliding five year average. For
example, data from 1957-1961 were averaged for the first
plot. The next plot was taken from 1958-1962 and so on
progressing one year at a time until 1980.
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